Effective, Experienced, Exceptional.

UCC

Subscribe to Consumer Finance

Thank you for your desire to subscribe to Severson & Werson’s Consumer Finance Weblog. In order to subscribe, you must provide a valid name and e-mail address. This too will be retained on our server. When you push the “subscribe button”, we will send an electronic mail to the address that you provided asking you to confirm your subscription to our Weblog. By pushing the “subscribe button”, you represent and warrant that you are over the age of 18 years old, are the owner/authorized user of that e-mail address, and are entitled to receive e-mails at that address. Our weblog will retain your name and e-mail address on its server, or the server of its web host. However, we won’t share any of this information with anyone except the Firm’s employees and contractors, except under certain extraordinary circumstances described on our Privacy Policy and (About The Consumer Finance Blog/About the Appellate Tracker Weblog) Page. NOTICE AND AGREEMENT REGARDING E-MAILS AND CALLS/TEXT MESSAGES TO LAND-LINE AND WIRELESS TELEPHONES: By providing your contact information and confirming your subscription in response to the initial e-mail that we send you, you agree to receive e-mail messages from Severson & Werson from time-to-time and understand and agree that such messages are or may be sent by means of automated dialing technology. If you have your email forwarded to other electronic media, including text messages and cellular telephone by way of VoIP, internet, social media, or otherwise, you agree to receive my messages in that way. This may result in charges to you. Your agreement and consent also extend to any other agents, affiliates, or entities to whom our communications are forwarded. You agree that you will notify Severson & Werson in writing if you revoke this agreement and that your revocation will not be effective until you notify Severson & Werson in writing. You understand and agree that you will afford Severson & Werson a reasonable time to unsubscribe you from the website, that the ability to do so depends on Severson & Werson’s press of business and access to the weblog, and that you may still receive one or more emails or communications from weblog until we are able to unsubscribe you.

In Breckenridge v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. 18-10787, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70049, at *11-12 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 2019), Judge Hood granted summary judgment to an automobile finance company as to a debtor's claim that the passage of time from repossession to sale violated the UCC. Nissan states that Plaintiffs have not produced any evidence that the Altima… Read More

In Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., No. C 17-02335 WHA, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21988 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2019), Judge Alsup granted summary judgment to a merchandise lessor against a class action plaintiff’s claim that the contracts were disguised security agreements subject to usury.  The allegations were as follows: Defendants Rent-A-Center, Inc. and Rent-A-Center West, Inc. (collectively "RAC") maintained rent-to-own… Read More

In Gomez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2018 WL 987398, at *6–7 (Mich.App., 2018), the Michigan Court of Appeals found that continued use of a vehicle after revocation of acceptance of non-conforming goods renders the revocation ineffective. Generally, if the buyer rejects the goods he is in possession of, he “is under a duty after rejection to hold them with reasonable… Read More

In SunTrust Bank v. Monroe, 2018 WL 651198, at *14 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, 2018), the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's finding that an auto finance company did not dispose of a repossessed vehicle in a commercially reasonable fashion. The jury here was instructed that every aspect of the disposition—method, manner, time, place, and other terms—had to be commercially reasonable, see Tex.… Read More

In Volvo Financial Services, Inc. v. Williamson, 2017 WL 4708136, at *3 (S.D.Miss., 2017), Judge Guirola held that the statute of limitations on a promissory note secured by a number of tractors did not accrue until all of the repossessed collateral was sold, due to a cross-collateralization clause in the note. The most reasonable interpretation of the statute when applied… Read More

In Gay v. Alliant Credit Union, 2017 WL 35704, at *4 (E.D.Mo., 2017), Judge Fleissig said that a creditor need not repossess a boat or bear liability once it sunk.  The debtor still owed the money. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the UCC, as codified by Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.9-609, by “promising that it would repossess the… Read More

In WM Capital Partners, LLC. v. Thornton, 2016 WL 7477738, at *3–6 (Tenn.Ct.App., 2016), the Tennessee Court of Appeals found that a secured party's delay in securing possession of the collateral -- which resulted in a lesser price realized at disposition -- was not a defense to the secured party's collection action because the UCC's commercially reasonable disposition requirement is… Read More

In Ford Motor Credit Company v. First National Bank of Crossett, 2016 WL 4916829, at *5–8 (Ark.App., 2016), the Arkansas Court of Appeal held that a RISC assignee's security interest was superior to that of a floorplan finance company's. FNBC acknowledges that a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes free of any underlying security interest created by the seller,… Read More

In Harley-Davidson Credit Corp. v. Galvin, 2015 WL 8121856, at *4-7 (1st Cir. 2015), the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for an airplane finance company, finding that sale of the repossessed airplane through a dealer might not have been commercially reasonable. Under Nevada law, a creditor may demonstrate that a sale through a dealer was “commercially reasonable”… Read More

1 2