In Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC v. Harris, — S.W.3d —-, 2012 WL 5464340 (Mo.App. S.D. 2012), the Missouri Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court’s finding that the sale of a vehicle at auto auction was commercially reasonable. The Court had some troubling language regarding the auto finance company’s ability to offer custodian-of-records testimony as to documents that it had in its files that it received as the assignee of the RISC from the dealer.  Nevertheless, the Court overruled the objection on procedural grounds.

Buyer argues on appeal that the trial court allowed Ms. Tummons to testify about the business records Assignee obtained from Dealer when “[t]here was no testimony whatsoever to indicate whether Ms. Tummons had personal knowledge of the mode of preparation of the documents or whether the records were made at or near the time of [the] act, condition or event giving rise to [Assignee’s] claim.” This is a significantly more detailed objection than the trial objection “to the lack of the witness’ qualification to authenticate a document from Blue Ridge Imports, Incorporated [“Dealer”] and/or Mazda American Credit.” Buyer also argues that as to “the collateral sale documents from Manheim Auction,” Ms. Tummons “had no actual knowledge to testify” concerning the mode of their preparation or whether they were made at or near the event giving rise to Assignee’s claim. ¶  Under section 490.680, “the records ‘custodian’ or ‘other qualified witness’ has to testify to the record’s identity, mode of preparation, and that it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the event that it records.” CACH, LLC v. Askew, 358 S.W.3d 58, 63 (Mo. banc 2012). “[P]ersonal knowledge of the sponsoring witness as to the mode of preparation of the documents sought to be admitted as business records is not required for the admission of those documents,” Asset Acceptance v. Lodge, 325 S.W.3d 525, 528 (Mo.App.E.D.2010), but a record that was actually “prepared by one business cannot qualify for the business records exception merely based on another business’s records custodian testifying that it appears in the files of the business that did not create the record.” CACH, 358 S.W.3d at 63. ¶  In the instant case, Buyer’s counsel objected to Exhibit 1 (a group of various documents) “due to the lack of the witness’ qualification to authenticate a document from [Dealer], and/or Mazda American Credit.” Assignee argues that the objection “was too general to advise the trial court about the basis of the objection” because it: 1) did not specify what legal element was missing, thereby making it “nothing more than an objection to a ‘lack of foundation’ “; and it 2) failed to identify the documents within the exhibit that were the target of the objection.

The Court affirmed the finding that the sale of the vehicle at a Manheim auction was commercially reasonable.

The second briefed portion of Buyer’s point contends that Assignee’s evidence of the commercial reasonableness of the sale was insufficient “in every respect as required by Missouri statute[,]” citing cases in which proof of commercial reasonableness was held insufficient. As earlier noted, the commercial reasonableness of a sale is a question of fact. Henson, 34 S.W.3d at 451. And section 400.9–627(b)(3) provides that the “disposition of collateral is made in a commercially reasonable manner if the disposition is made … in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition.” ¶  Buyer argues that Assignee did not establish that it used Manheim Auction for other repossessed vehicles and that the use of a private dealer auction was a reasonable commercial practice among dealers. He also asserts that Ms. Tummons’s testimony that the price received was reasonable constituted a conclusory statement lacking any underlying factual support. Buyer insists that while “[Manheim Auction] has offices at the location cited on its invoice [ ], there was absolutely no evidence presented by [Assignee] as to where the particular auction of the vehicle in question took place.” Buyer also asserts that because Ms. Tummons was not personally present for the vehicle’s sale, it was impossible for her to testify that the location and time were commercially reasonable. ¶  The unobjected-to evidence before the trial court included Ms. Tummons’s testimony that Assignee notified Buyer that it intended to sell the vehicle at a private sale if Buyer did not redeem the vehicle within ten days; the vehicle was in “[b]elow average” condi-tion based upon its damaged exterior, damaged interior, dead battery and dirty oil; Assignee had valued the vehicle at “a little more than $3,900”; and Manheim Auction sold the vehicle at a dealers-only auction for $4,000. ¶  As to Buyer’s specific complaint about Assignee’s failure to prove the date and time of the sale, Buyer’s failure to deposit Exhibit 1 again causes us to presume that it contained evidence from which the time and place of the sale could be gleaned. Briar Rd., 321 S.W.3d at 492. ¶  Ms. Tummons also testified, without objection, that Assignee customarily sold repossessed vehicles through Manheim Auction, she was aware that other finance companies sold repossessed cars in the same way, and based upon her 25 years experience working for Assignee, the vehicle’s sale was commercially reasonable. Because Buyer did not object at trial to the admissibility of her opinion, the issue is not preserved for our review. See George Weis Co. v. Dwyer, 956 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Mo.App.E.D.1997) (“to argue on appeal that the subject of [an expert’s] testimony was improper, [the challenging party] must object on that basis during trial”). Thus, Buyer’s claim that no sub-stantial evidence supported a finding that the sale was made in a commercially reasonable manner also fails. See Delaney, 639 S.W.2d at 604. ¶  Buyer’s point is denied, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.