Following Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami (2017) 137 S.Ct. 1296, this decision holds that Oakland failed to allege facts showing its harm was proximately caused by Wells Fargo’s alleged violation of the Fair Housing Act (42 USC 3613) by discriminating against Black and Hispanic borrowers, steering them to higher cost loans and loans with features that made foreclosure more likely.  Oakland claimed that higher foreclosure rates caused by the discrimination, caused Oakland to  suffer damages through decreased tax assessments and tax revenues.  Under the City of Miami test, mere foreseeability of harm is insufficient.  There must be a direct relationship between discrimination and damage, and as a general rule it cannot go beyond the first step of the causal chain. Oakland’s damage claim went beyond the first step of harm to minority borrowers to a third or fourth step of depressed home values, lower tax revenues and increased city expenses. Any exception to the first step limitation depends on the statutory language.  The FHA’s statutory language–unlike RICO or the Lanham Act–did not suggest any reason for extending causation beyond the first step.  The difficulties in administering a damage claim like Oakland’s also counseled against its proximate cause theory.  Foreclosures were caused by many factors, not just Wells Fargo’s alleged discrimination. Oakland’s regression analyses did not make it certain that Wells Fargo’s discrimination caused the foreclosures, but only made it more likely.  Though there was no danger of multiple recoveries for lost taxes, that alone did not justify extending causation beyond the first step.  The borrowers were more direct plaintiffs who could be counted on to sue if discriminated against.  The proximate cause requirement also felled Oakland’s claim for increased municipal expenses and its prayers for injunctive and declaratory relief.