To have standing to sue for an antitrust violation, the plaintiff must allege an injury arising from the aspect of the alleged antitrust violation that causes the evil at which the antitrust laws are aimed; namely, a reduction in competition. Here, the alleged violation was a pre-merger agreement between the merging entities not to compete for each other’s customers before the merger was consummated. However, plaintiff did not allege, as a salesman for one of the companies, he was barred from soliciting the other company’s customers. Instead, he alleged he was only barred from using a particular sales pitch in doing so–namely, saying that after the merger, the customers would have to satisfy his company’s stricter underwriting standards so they ought to switch before the merger. That sales pitch tried to profit from the merger’s eventual reduction of competition and so was not the type of injury that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. So summary judgment was properly granted to defendant.