During these challenging times, Severson & Werson remains open and in full operation, consistent with the firm’s previously established contingency planning. While many of our attorneys and staff will be working remotely, as a firm, we continue in full operation. We are here to help, as always.

Effective, Experienced, Exceptional.

Firm Profile

Art. III Standing

Subscribe to Consumer Finance

Thank you for your desire to subscribe to Severson & Werson’s Consumer Finance Weblog. In order to subscribe, you must provide a valid name and e-mail address. This too will be retained on our server. When you push the “subscribe button”, we will send an electronic mail to the address that you provided asking you to confirm your subscription to our Weblog. By pushing the “subscribe button”, you represent and warrant that you are over the age of 18 years old, are the owner/authorized user of that e-mail address, and are entitled to receive e-mails at that address. Our weblog will retain your name and e-mail address on its server, or the server of its web host. However, we won’t share any of this information with anyone except the Firm’s employees and contractors, except under certain extraordinary circumstances described on our Privacy Policy and (About The Consumer Finance Blog/About the Appellate Tracker Weblog) Page. NOTICE AND AGREEMENT REGARDING E-MAILS AND CALLS/TEXT MESSAGES TO LAND-LINE AND WIRELESS TELEPHONES: By providing your contact information and confirming your subscription in response to the initial e-mail that we send you, you agree to receive e-mail messages from Severson & Werson from time-to-time and understand and agree that such messages are or may be sent by means of automated dialing technology. If you have your email forwarded to other electronic media, including text messages and cellular telephone by way of VoIP, internet, social media, or otherwise, you agree to receive my messages in that way. This may result in charges to you. Your agreement and consent also extend to any other agents, affiliates, or entities to whom our communications are forwarded. You agree that you will notify Severson & Werson in writing if you revoke this agreement and that your revocation will not be effective until you notify Severson & Werson in writing. You understand and agree that you will afford Severson & Werson a reasonable time to unsubscribe you from the website, that the ability to do so depends on Severson & Werson’s press of business and access to the weblog, and that you may still receive one or more emails or communications from weblog until we are able to unsubscribe you.

Well that’s interesting. 7th Cir. Refuses to Grant Petition to Compel Arbitration of FDCPA Claim Because Plaintiff Lacked Art. III Jurisdiction to Start.

by Scott J. Hyman |

In Nettles v. Midland Funding LLC, No. 19-3327, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 40012 (7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2020), the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit declined to address arbitration of an FDCPA case because of lack of Art. III jurisdiction to start. Most of the briefing concerns the arbitration issue, but the parties also identify a possible problem with… Read More

11th Cir. Says Overshadowing Claim Based on Second Dunning Letter Sent During FDCPA’s 30-day Validation Period Did Not Confer Art. III Standing

by Scott J. Hyman |

In Cooper v. Atl. Credit & Fin., No. 19-12177, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 23719 (11th Cir. July 28, 2020), the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit found no Article III standing for an overshadowing claim under the FDCPA. Here, Cooper's alleged injuries are just  as inchoate, if not more so. She does not allege that, without the purportedly confusing… Read More

SCOTUS Remands Google Privacy Class Action Settlement to Evaluate Spokeo Standing

by Scott J. Hyman |

In Frank v. Gaos, the SCOTUS today placed further standing impediments to privacy and other purely statutory/no damages class actions, finding, following objections to the class action settlement, that the case should be remanded to determine standing under Spokeo.  The background facts were as follows: Three named plaintiffs brought class action claims against Google for alleged violations of the Stored Communications Act.… Read More

6th Cir. Says Congress Lacks Authority to Create Injury under Article III When There Was None; Dismisses FDCPA Letter Case for Lack of Standing

by Scott J. Hyman |

In Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 2018 WL 914953, at *3–5 (C.A.6 (Ohio), 2018), the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that "[w]e know of no circuit court decision since Spokeo that endorses an anything-hurts-so-long-as-Congress-says-it-hurts theory of Article III injury.".  Thus, the 6th Circuit held that a bare FDCPA violation without correlative injury did not vest Article III… Read More

District Court (Cal.) Says Rosenthal Act Complaint about Collection Letter Does Not Satisfy Spokeo

by Scott J. Hyman |

In Provo v. Rady Childrens Hospital-San Diego, 2016 WL 4625556, at *2 (S.D.Cal., 2016), Judge Miller dismissed a Rosenthal Act claim with leave to amend because the Plaintiffs had not pleaded any concrete injury under Spokeo.  Here, the only harm Plaintiffs plead is in reference to phone calls made by CMRE's codefendant, Rady, which Plaintiffs allege caused “undue stress, anxiety, and frustration....”… Read More

District Court (Ill.) Rejects Spokeo-challenge to FDCPA Class Action

by Scott J. Hyman |

In Quinn v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 2016 WL 4264967, at *4–5 (N.D.Ill., 2016), Judge Bucklo rejected a Spokeo challenge to an FDCPA class action grounded in the Defendant's alleged contact with represented debtors. I am unpersuaded. As an initial matter, despite SLS's suggestion to the contrary, Spokeo does not stand for the proposition that a procedural violation of a… Read More

District Court (Pa.) Says Douglass-type Glassine Window FDCPA Violation Confers Spokeo Standing In-and-of-Itself

by Scott J. Hyman |

In Daubert v. NRA Group, LLC, 2016 WL 4245560, at *4 (M.D.Pa., 2016), Judge Caputo found that a Douglass-glassine window violation confers Article III standing under Spokeo.  Similarly, here, Plaintiff's injury is also the unlawful disclosure of legally protected information. This injury is “clearly particularized,” as Plaintiff alleges that it was his personal identifying information that was disclosed. This injury… Read More