In Rotkiske v. Klemm, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S. 8 (U.S. 2019), the Supreme Court rejected the application of a discovery rule in FDCPA cases.
Rotkiske does not contest the plain meaning of §1692k(d)’s text or claim that he brought suit within one year of the alleged FDCPA violation. Instead, he suggests that we should interpret §1692k(d) to include a general “discovery rule” that applies to all FDCPA actions. In effect, Rotkiske asks the Court to read in a provision stating that §1692k(d)’s limitations period begins to run on the date an alleged FDCPA violation is discovered. This expansive approach to the discovery rule is a “bad wine of recent vintage.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 37, 122 S. Ct. 441, 151 L. Ed. 2d 339 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that “absent provision[s] cannot be supplied by the courts.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 94 (2012). To do so “‘is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court.’” Nichols v. United States, 578 U. S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 194 L. Ed. 2d 324, 330 (2016) (quoting Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245, 251, 46 S. Ct. 248, 70 L. Ed. 566, 62 Ct. Cl. 755, 1926-1 C.B. 365, T.D. 3846 (1926)). A textual judicial supplementation is particularly inappropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provision. Congress has enacted statutes that expressly include the language Rotkiske asks us to read in, setting limitations periods to run from the date on which the violation occurs or the date of discovery of such violation. See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §3416; 15 U. S. C. §1679i. In fact, at the time Congress enacted the FDCPA, many statutes included provisions that, in certain circumstances, would begin the running of a limitations period upon the discovery of a violation, injury, or some other event. See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §77m (1976 ed.); 19 U. S. C. §1621 (1976 ed.); 26 U. S. C. §7217(c) (1976 ed.); 29 U. S. C. §1113 (1976 ed.). It is not our role to second-guess Congress’ decision to include a “violation occurs” provision, rather than a discovery provision, in §1692k(d). The length of a limitations period “reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 463-464, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1975). It is Congress, not this Court, that balances those interests. We simply enforce the value judgments made by Congress.