In Boyd v. General Revenue Corp., 2013 WL 866944 (M.D.Tenn. 2013), Judge Haynes held that the TCPA does not regulate manually dialed calls to cellular telephones.

Plaintiff’s TCPA claims are that: (1) Defendants willfully and knowingly violated the TCPA by placing forty-two (42) telephone calls using an auto-dialer to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, as Plaintiff is registered with the Federal Do Not Call List; (2) Defendant called Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s permission; and (3) Defendant left a voice mail on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone without Plain-tiff’s permission. Plaintiff also alleges that the he does not have a business relationship with GRC.  ¶  Sallie Mae contends that Plaintiff’s claim under the TCPA fails because Plaintiff’s proof does not identify Sallie Mae in any of the alleged calls. (Docket Entry No. 41 at 7). Sallie Mae also asserts that the last contact between Sallie Mae and Plaintiff occurred four years prior to Plaintiff’s filing of this action and outside of the applicable four year statute of limitations. Id. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s proof fails to establish any calls by Sallie Mae. Thus, the Court concludes that Defendant Sallie Mae’s motion for summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff’s claims under the TCPA. ¶  GRC first contends that Plaintiff’s claims under the TCPA fail because GRC did not make any calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone with an auto-dialer. (Docket Entry No. 55 at 7–8). GRC’s business records reflect that the calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were made by an individual debt collector, not by an auto-dialer. Id. at 8. GRC, how-ever, did use an auto-dialer when calling Plaintiff’s home or work telephone numbers. The evidentiary documents submitted reflect that Defendant made various automated calls to Plaintiff’s home telephone number, not to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. Given that all calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number were dialed manually, the Court concludes that calls to Defendant’s cellular telephone were lawful under the TCPA. ¶  As to the prerecorded messages, the Court must determine whether there was appropriate express consent. Here, Plaintiff freely provided his information during the loan application process and under the terms of the loan, Plaintiff had an obligation to remedy any default. Thus, the Court concludes that GRC did not violate the TCPA’s cellular telephone provisions and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.  ¶  GRC also contends that Plaintiff fails to cite any provision of the TCPA that precludes a debt collector from calling a telephone or leaving a voice mail without the owner’s permission. (Docket Entry No. 55 at 8–9). GRC argues that “the TCPA does not prohibit manually dialed calls to a cell telephone regardless of whether there is permission given…. a complete reading of the TCPA does not reveal any prohibition against a business leaving a message on another’s cell telephone.” Id. Moreover, GRC asserts that Plaintiff had a legitimate debt and GRC was entitled to collect on that debt. Id. at 9. Further, Plaintiff’s own telephone call log does not indicate which telephone each call was made to, how the calls were made, or whether GRC left a voice mail. ¶  The Federal Communications Commission has exempted from the requirements relating to calls to residential telephone lines calls that do “not include or introduce an unsolicited advertisement or constitute a telephone solicitation.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) (iii). Moreover, decisional law recognizes that debt collection calls made to a residential line are exempt from the TCPA under Section (b)(1)(B) See Bates v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 09–CV–103A, 2009 WL 3459740, *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009). Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims that GRC unlawfully called and left voice messages on Plaintiff’s residential and work telephone lines fail and GRC’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.