In Chatman v. GC Services, LP, — F.Supp.3d —-, 2014 WL 5783095 (D.S.C. 2014), Judge Currie found that two voicemail messages left by a debt collector for the debtor violated the FDCPA because they did not meaningfully disclose the callers’ identity. The facts were as follows. Chatman received two very similar voice messages on her cellular telephone in May 2013.  The earlier of the two messages was as follows: “This message is intended for Kim Chatman. My name is Olivia [last name inaudible]. It is important for you to return my call. My number is 866–862–2789.”  The second message was as follows: “Hello, this message is intended for Kim Chatman. My name is Angel [last name inaudible]. Please return my phone call at 866–862–2789. Thank you.”

With respect to the third element, Chatman argues that the two messages violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). See ECF No. 1 ¶ 56 (first cause of action), ¶ 58 (second cause of action). Subject to one specific exception, Section 1692d(6) prohibits “the placement of telephone calls [by a debt collector] without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.” The one exception is for calls placed pursuant to Section 1692b, which addresses communications by a debt collector with “any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer[.]” FN8 “Meaningful disclosure requires that the debt collector state his or her name, capacity, and provide enough information to the consumer as to the purpose of the call.” Doshay v. Global Credit Collection Corp., 796 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1304 (D.Colo.2011) (addressing claim under Section 1692d(6)). Section 1692e(11) requires a debt collector, in all communications with the consumer after the first (which must include more detailed disclosures) to “disclose … that the communication is from a debt collector.” ¶ Chatman has presented uncontroverted evidence that the two messages at issue provided only the caller’s first name, an inaudible last name, and a request that Plaintiff return the call at a specified number. Neither message disclosed that the call was made by or on behalf of GC, that GC was a debt collector, or that the call was for the purpose of collecting a debt. Thus, based on Plaintiff’s uncontroverted description of the messages, it appears at first blush that both messages violated the plain language of Sections 1692d(6) and 1692e(11). ¶ GC argues that, even if the messages were as Chatman alleges, they did not violate Section 1692e(11) because the messages were not “communications” as defined by the FDCPA. ECF No. 47 at 7–9. GC also argues that the alleged messages did not violate Section 1692d(6) because the calls were for the purpose of locating Chatman and, consequently, were exempt under Section 1692b. ECF No. 47 at 9–12. Both arguments fail for reasons explained below.