In Gager v. Dell Financial Services, LLC 2012 WL 1942079 (M.D.Pa. 2012), Judge Mariani found irrelevant the whole debate over whether the TCPA requires revocation of consent to be called on a cellular telephone to be in writing or not.  Judge Mariani instead found that nothing in the TCPA allows consent, once given, to be revoked by the consumer.  Instead, a consumer who gives his or her cellular telephone number in the application must limit consent at that time.  Judge Mariani explained:

Plaintiff provides several out of circuit, district court cases for the proposition that withdrawal of consent to contact after the consummation of a credit contract is permissible under the TCPA; nevertheless, these cases discuss only the methods of revocation (written notice versus sufficiency of oral revocation), and do not address the propriety of revocation itself or when such revocation may be permitted. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Barclays Group, 2011 WL 579238 (S.D.Cal.2011); Adamcik v. Credit Control Services, Inc., 2011 WL 6793976 (W.D.Tex.2011); Starkey v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC, 2010 WL 2541756 (W.D.N.Y.2010); Cunningham v. Credit Mgmt., L.P., 2010 WL 3791104 (N.D.Tex.2010); Moore v. Firstsource Advabtage, LLC, 2011 WL 4345703 (W.D.N.Y.2011); Moltz v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC, 2011 WL 3360010 (W.D.N.Y.2011). Every one of these cases, however, is distinguishable from the present matter in that they (1) concerned circumstances requiring the application of the TCPA in conjunction with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq ., and as a result, infused FDCPA mandates into the TCPA, or (2) assume, without support, that a revocation of consent to contact under the TCPA is authorized by the statute and its implementing regulations. In those cases initiated under both the TCPA and FDCPA, where the defendants were “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, the courts’ analyses and ultimate determinations have no application here.  ¶  The cases cited by Plaintiff and Defendant fall into two broad categories, generally represented by the holdings of Starkey, supra, and Adamcik, supra. In Starkey, the plaintiff provided her cellular telephone number to a cable company in connection with the establishment of an account. Following the cable company’s failure to collect a debt from the plaintiff, the cable company turned the file over to a third-party collection agency. After receiving many prerecorded calls from the collection agency, the plaintiff contacted a live operator and orally withdrew consent to be called on that number. The plaintiff sued the debt collector for violations of both the TCPA and the FDCPA. The court analyzed both statutes and found that “debt collection efforts are governed by the FDCPA,” thus requiring any request to cease collection calls under the TCPA to be in writing so as to comport with the withdrawal of consent provisions of the FDCPA.  Starkey, 2010 WL 2541756, at *6. The Starkey court essentially infused the written withdrawal requirement of the FDCPA into the TCPA because the debt collector in that case was subject to both statutes. ¶ …In the line of cases following the court’s reasoning in Starkey, various district courts have read the written notice requirement governing the withdrawal of consent to contact under the FDCPA into the TCPA. In fact, these courts have construed the TCPA to include a withdrawal of consent provision that cannot be found in the text of the statute. See, e.g., Cunningham, 2010 WL 3791104 (N.D.Tex.2010) (following Starkey, withdrawal of consent to contact under TCPA must be in writing to comport with pro-visions of FDCPA); Moore, 2011 WL 4345703 (W.D.N.Y.2011) (following Starkey, withdrawal of consent to contact under TCPA must be in writing to comport with provisions of FDCPA); and Moltz, 2011 WL 3360010 (W.D.N.Y.2011 (following Starkey, FDCPA found to override TCPA in debt collection matters, thus requiring written withdrawal of consent to be contacted). Each of those cases, like Starkey, is distinguishable from the matter sub judice because the litigants assert claims under the FDCPA against “debt collectors” as that term is defined under the FDCPA. Here, Defendant is not a “debt collector,” and none of the provisions governing debt collection under the FDCPA are applicable. Plaintiff is left only with the protections of the TCPA as that individual statute is written. . . ¶ In Gutierrez, 2011 WL 579238 (S.D.Cal. Feb. 9, 2011), the Southern District of California also broke with Starkey, and held that oral revocation of consent to contact under the TCPA was sufficient. Id. at *3–4. Gutierrez did not involve the FDCPA, and the court found that the facts buttressing the Starkey decision were factually distinct from those presented in a case involving the TCPA alone. Id. at *3. Specifically, the court noted that “Starkey addressed the separate question of whether written notice is required to cease debt collection calls, particularly under the [ FDCPA].” Id. The Gutierrez court, however, still recognized that revocation of consent was still possible after the consummation of a credit contract. Id. at *4.  ¶  We do not find the statutory construction and reasoning in Starkey, Adamcik, or Gutierrez, to be persuasive, and expressly decline to hold that the TCPA, or any FCC regulation or advisory opinion construing the statute, contains any provision permitting this Court to find post-formation revocation of consent authorized under the provisions of the TCPA. While the Starkey line might have applicability if Defendant were subject to the FDCPA, under the prevailing law of the Third Circuit, Defendant is not a “debt collector” as defined by that statute; thus, the right to withdraw consent provisions enacted under the FDCPA do not apply to Defendant, and we do not find any TCPA provision allowing revocation, so that Plaintiffs claims that her rights were violated under the TCPA, assuming all of the facts in her Amended Complaint as true, do not state a cause of action. ¶ Furthermore, although the 1992 TCPA Order permits prerecorded calls to mobile telephones if a debtor consents to such calls, the “absent instructions to the contrary” language does not explicitly or im-plicitly state that a later revocation is permitted. See 1992 TCPA Order, at 8769. A plain reading of the regulation indicates that such “instructions to the contrary” are to be provided at the time a person “knowingly release[s]” her telephone number, thereby giving her “invitation or permission to be called” at that number.  See 1992 TCPA Order, at 8769. For instance, if a debtor listed her mobile telephone number on an application for credit, and at the time she submitted the application she instructed the creditor not to call her on that number for debt collection purposes, it is hardly a question that the debtor has issued “instructions to the contrary,” so that consent to contact on that mobile number is absent. The FCC’s use of the phrase “absent instructions to the contrary” does not provide a basis for this Court to find such instructions as providing a method of revocation. ¶  Finally, “the FCC has determined that all debt-collection circumstances are excluded from the TCPA’s coverage.” Osorio v. State Farm Bank, No. 11–61880, 2012 WL 1671780, at *4 (S.D.Fla. May 10, 2012). Under the TCPA, “as clearly stated in the December 28, 2007 FCC Declaratory Ruling, calls regarding debt collection or to recover payment are not subject to the TCPA’s separate restrictions on ‘telephone solicitations.’ “ Id. at *5. The FCC has “unequivocally stated” that “calls solely for the purpose of debt collection are not telephone solicitations and do not constitute telemarketing” and “calls regarding debt collection … are not subject to the TCPA’s separate restrictions on ‘telephone solicitations.’ “ Meadows v. Franklin Collection Servs., Inc., 414 F. App’x 230, 236 (11th Cir.2011). ¶  Accordingly, when viewed through the prism of Iqbal and Twombly, and taking all allegations set forth in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint as true, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable cause of action, and a dismissal of her claim is required.