In Sharp v. Ally Financial, Inc., 2018 WL 4300018, at *18 (W.D.N.Y., 2018), Judge Wolford found that a TCPA claim survived the Plaintiff’s death.
Accordingly, the Court declines to follow the rationale and the conclusion set forth in Hannabury to the extent discussed above, and holds that a private claim brought pursuant to § 227(b)(3) and § 227(c)(5) of the TCPA is primarily of a “remedial” nature, and thus, it did not extinguish upon Plaintiff’s death. See Parchman, 896 F.3d at 740-41 (holding that the TCPA is a remedial statute and simply because it “ ‘allows for accumulated recovery does not convert an otherwise remedial statutory scheme into a penal one’ ” (quoting Murphy, 560 F.2d at 210) ).
The District Court, despite some procedural irregularities, withheld ruling on the Reyes question until the Plaintiff had a chance to conduct some discovery.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s initial argument that the dismissal of the TCPA claims based upon the holding in Reyes would be premature without additional discovery. Plaintiff’s assertion that Reyes does not apply to the facts of this case due to the nature of the credit applications and the retail installment contract raises new arguments that touch upon the merits of Defendant’s Reyes contention. (See Dkt. 47-1; Dkt 49; Dkt. 50). These new contentions could have and should have been raised in Plaintiff’s initial memorandum in opposition to Defendant’s supplemental memorandum. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to file supplemental briefing, and Plaintiff’s motion to seal is also denied as moot. Of course, Plaintiff may raise these arguments in opposition to any subsequent motion filed by Defendant that seeks to apply Reyes to the instant facts.