To comply with the TILA, Defendant had to provide Plaintiffs with the proper disclosures, including an accurate finance charge amount, before their transaction was consummated. Defendant did so; listing the finance charge of $1,940.59 in the loan documents that Plaintiffs signed on January 26. By signing the documents, Plaintiffs consummated the transaction; they became obligated to pay at that time. See id. And because the transaction was consummated on January 26, it was appropriate (and consistent with the TILA) for Defendant to calculate the finance charge using that day as the start date. That Plaintiffs signed a second contract seven days later does not alter this conclusion. The second version only made cosmetic changes to the contract by changing “AC” to “Acadia” and altering some typeface. All of the other terms of the agreement, including Plaintiffs’ financial obligations and the date of the first payment, remained the same. Because the revised contract did not alter a single obligation that Plaintiffs had under the initial contract, the revisions did not change the date of consummation. See Chapman v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 651 F. App’x 508, 512 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that because the alleged existence of a true creditor did not change the plaintiffs’ obligations under the agreement, it did not change the date of consummation). In fact, the revised contract could not have changed the consummation date because Plaintiffs did not incur a new obligation to pay when they signed the contract. Indeed, Defendant’s conduct was consistent with the central goal of the TILA: “to provide meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him.” Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1068 (11th Cir. 2004), quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). Understandably, for disclosures to be “meaningful,” they must be accurately made before the transaction is consummated. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b). That occurred here. Nothing in the second contract, which did not change a single financial term, impaired Plaintiffs’ ability to make an informed decision regarding their credit. See § 1601(a). Thus, this is not a scenario in which the TILA’s protections are required. Finally, this conclusion is not altered by Plaintiffs’ principal case, Rucker v. Sheehy Alexandria, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717 (E.D. Va. 2002). Although Plaintiffs characterize it as “factually identical” to their case, they ignore key distinguishing facts. In Rucker, like here, the plaintiff signed a retail installment sales contract and then signed a second one ten days later. Id. at 713-14. She then sued under the TILA after the dealership backdated the second contract. Id. at 715. But this is where the similarities end. In Rucker, unlike here, the first agreement was null and void when the second agreement was signed. Id. at 713. And the second agreement considerably altered the financial terms, including the amount financed, the finance charge, and the annual percentage rate. Id. at 714. In those circumstances, the court sensibly held that the plaintiff did not become obligated on the credit transaction until the day she signed the second agreement, thereby making that the date when the transaction was consummated. Id. at 716. Not so here; Plaintiffs’ first agreement was never nullified and their second agreement did not alter any of the initially agreed upon financial terms. Thus, unlike in Rucker, Plaintiffs’ consummation date remained unchanged. In sum, because Plaintiffs’ agreement was consummated on January 26, the second retail sales installment contract properly calculated the finance charge by using that day as the start date. Thus, it appropriately included the paltry $11.94 with which Plaintiffs take issue. Therefore, because a reasonable jury could not conclude that Defendant violated the TILA on this basis, the Court shall grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Two.