In Alexander v. Blackhawk Recovery and Investigation, L.L.C. — F.Supp.2d —-, 2010 WL 3257355 (E.D.Mich.), Judge Steeh held that a repossessor might be subject to the FDCPA when the repossessor breaches the peace in connection with a vehicle repossession.   Judge Steeh explained: 


In Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Silver Shadow, the defendant-repossession agency, was not a debt collector under the express terms of the FDCPA. 346 F.3d at 699-701. . . . The court found that “except for purposes of § 1692f(6), an enforcer of a security interest, such as a repossession agency, does not meet the statutory definition of a debt collector under the FDCPA.”  Id. at 700-01. Because Silver Shadow did not qualify as a debt collector under § 1692d and § 1692e, and the plaintiff had not alleged any violation of § 1692f(6), the Montgomery court upheld the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against the repossession agency. Id. at 701. Therefore, under the express terms of the statute, a repossession agency such as Blackhawk falls outside the ambit of the FDCPA, except for purposes of § 1692f(6).   Montgomery, 346 F.3d at 700; see also, Pflueger v. Auto Finance Group, Inc., no. cv-97-9499, 1999 WL 33740813, *3 (C.D. Cal. April 26, 1999); Purkett v. Key Bank USA, N.A., no. 01-C-162, 2001 WL 503050, *2 (N.D.Ill. May 10, 2001). ¶  In Alexander’s response to Blackhawk’s motion for summary judgment, Alexander concedes that Blackhawk is not a debt collector under §§ 1692a, 1692e and 1692g of the FDCPA, but argues that dismissal is nonetheless inappropriate because Blackhawk “is clearly a debt collector under [ ] § 1692f(6) given the facts and circumstances set forth in this matter.”  . . . ¶  Courts presented with the issue of determining whether a repossession agency has violated § 1692f(6) look to the applicable state self-help repossession statute which identifies the circumstances under which an enforcer of a security interest does not have a present right to the collateral at issue. See Purkett, 2001 WL 503050, at *2-3; Fleming-Dudley, 2007 WL 952026, at *5. . . .¶  Michigan’s self-help repossession statute provides that, after a default, a secured party may take possession of collateral without judicial process if it proceeds without breach of the peace. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 440.9609(1)-(2).  . . . The court cannot locate any case law outside of the criminal context, and the parties have cited to none, which defines breach of the peace under circumstances of attempted repossession of collateral. A breach of the peace has been defined as “a public offense done by violence, or one causing or likely to cause an immediate disturbance of the peace.” Saice v. MidAmerica Bank, no. civ. 98-2396, 1999 WL 33911356, *2 (D.Minn. Sept. 30, 1999) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 116). In Pflueger, the court was likewise faced with a lack of state case or statutory law defining a breach of the peace. Pflueger, 1999 WL 33740813, at *6. The Plueger court relied on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals conclusion that repossession agencies may breach the peace when acts are committed which “tend to provoke violence.” Id. (citing Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 674 F.2d 717, 719-20 (8th Cir.1982). The Pflueger court concluded that questions of fact remained as to whether the defendant committed a breach of the peace when its agents threw rocks at the plaintiff’s home and shouted obscenities in attempting to repossess a vehicle. Id.    Alexander has met his burden of coming forward with specific facts demonstrating a question of fact remains as to whether Blackhawk breached the peace, and thereby lost its right to possession of the vehicle on the dates of the claimed disturbances. At his deposition, Alexander testified that on several occasions, Blackhawk went to his residence at unreasonable hours, pounded loudly on his door while yelling and at times used offensive language. On at least one occasion, Alexander witnessed Blackhawk employees trying to break into his garage. These incidents were likely to lead to an immediate public disturbance or provoke violence. Further, the type of conduct described by Alexander, if true, is the type of abusive practice Congress sought to prevent in enacting FDCPA and specifically § 1692f(6).