What distinguishes an ATDS, according to both the FCC and several federal courts, is the capacity of the system “to dial telephone numbers from a list without human intervention.” Graggv. Orange Cab Co., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1192 (W.D. Wash. 2014); see also Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2014 WL 7005102, *3 (N.D. Il. 2014); Luna, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 940; Davis, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 225. “Dialing systems which require an agent to manually initiate calls do not qualify as autodialers under the TCPA.” Pozo v. Stellar Recovery Collection Agency, Inc., 2016 WL 7851415, *3 (M.D. Fla. 2016). . . Even if I were to accept a broad reading of the FCC’s definition of an ATDS as a system which may draw phone numbers from a database, rather than only through a random or sequential number generator, there would be no genuine issue of material fact on Mr. Hatuey’s TCP claim. Both Mr. Hatuey and ICS agree that the relevant calls were placed using a system known as LiveVox HCI, and that this system requires a human “clicker agent” who must manually click a button to place a call. This alone disqualifies the LiveVox HCI system as an ATDS under the TCPA. See, e.g., Pozo, 2016 WL 7851415 at *3-4 (holding that the identical software – the LiveVox HCI, is not an ATDS because it uses a “clicker agent”); Schlusselberg v. Receivables Performance Management, LLC, 2017 WL 2812884, *3 (D. N.J. 2017)(same); Jenkins v. mGage, LLC, 2016 WL 4263937, *5 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (holding that a similar software which requires an individual to click to initiate a call is not an ATDS). Mr. Hatuey has not adduced any evidence that ICS used any other kind of software to place its calls to him. He has also not produced any LiveVox HCI software manuals or similar instructions guides that could show that the system, in fact and in derogation of previous findings in the case law, does place calls automatically. Given the state of the summary judgment record, no reasonable jury could conclude that ICS used a system that does not require human intervention to place the telephone calls at issue. Because the record demonstrates as a matter of law that it did not, the phone calls Mr. Hatuey seeks to put at issue here fall outside the scope of the TCPA’s prohibition. Consequently, ICS is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, I will grant summary judgment in favor of ICS on the TCPA claim.