In Dixon v. General Motors Financial Corporation, 2018 WL 746379, at *4 (E.D.La., 2018), Judge Brown found that a TILA claim was not stated because any violation would have to appear on the face of the document and the Plaintiff had filed suit longer than 1-year after purchasing the vehicle.
In Jackson v. Adcock, another division of this district held that a pro se plaintiff’s TILA claims were barred by the TILA statute of limitations when the plaintiff filed suit more than a year after reading and signing loan documents. The court reasoned that the doctrine of equitable tolling did not apply, since “[n]othing prevented [plaintiff] from comparing the loan documents and TILA’s statutory and regulatory requirements. Moreover, in Melancon v. Countrywide Bank, a different division of this district similarly held that the pro se plaintiffs’ TILA claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations when plaintiffs brought the action over two years after the consummation of the applicable mortgage. Here, similar to Jackson and Melancon, Plaintiff has brought claims for damages under TILA more than one year after signing the agreement. As Defendants point out, Plaintiff filed his lawsuit on May 2, 2017, but he entered into the lease on December 2, 2014. Moreover, similar to Jackson, nothing prevented Plaintiff from comparing the lease documents and TILA’s statutory and regulatory requirements. As a result, it “appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his [TILA] claim which would entitle him to relief.” Considering that Plaintiff’s TILA claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, it is unnecessary to evaluate Defendants’s additional TILA arguments.
The District Court also found that the plaintiff stated no ADA claim because the ADA did not apply.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would give rise to a claim under the ADA, as Plaintiff “has not alleged any act of discrimination based on a disability in the context of public services or public accommodations provided by GM Financial…[and] does not allege that he was employed by GM Financial.” In opposition, Plaintiff states that he “is a 100% disabled individual, whose disability appears to have been dismissed and trashed by the insensitive assertions of defense counsel, as a prolongation of a distraction.” The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in terms of employment, the services of a public entity, and public accommodation. Here, Plaintiff was not employed by Defendants, nor was he seeking employment by Defendants. As a result, Title I of the ADA does not apply. Moreover, Defendants include a private corporation and officers of that corporation, rather than a public entity. Thus, Title II of the ADA does not apply. Finally, Defendants were not providing public services or accommodations to Plaintiff. Instead, Plaintiff was leased a vehicle for his private use.