In Glen Ellyn Pharmacy, Inc. v. Meda Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2011 WL 6156800 (N.D.Ill. 2011), Judge Gotschall rejected a TCPA defendant’s claim for contribution/indemnity under the TCPA, explaining:
Instead, the TCPA itself strongly suggests that Congress never intended to create such a right. For instance, the TCPA contemplates treble damages, see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), which indicates that Congress had no intent to include a right of contribution. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639–40, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981) (in the context of the Clayton and Sherman Acts, noting that the existence of a treble damages provision “reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers”; this, combined with the “absence of any reference to contribution in the legislative history” led the Supreme Court to con-clude that “Congress neither expressly nor implicitly intended to create a right to contribution”). Likewise, the TCPA’s remedial scheme—whereby both private and government actors enforce the law—provides some support to the conclusion that Congress in-tended to limit the remedies to those expressly de-scribed. See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 93–94, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981) (“The comprehensive charac-ter of the remedial scheme expressly fashioned by Congress strongly evidences an intent not to author-ize additional remedies. It is, of course, not within our competence as federal judges to amend these comprehensive enforcement schemes by adding to them another private remedy not authorized by Con-gress.”). Finally, this court has not identified (nor has Hal Lewis cited) any support for the notion of contri-bution in the TCPA’s legislative history. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 109–76 (2005); S.Rep. No. 102–178 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S .C.C.A.N.1968; H.R. Rep. 102–317 (1991). So there is no right to contribution under the TCPA. The question then becomes whether the so-called “federal common law” can be expanded to provide such a right. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 638 (“[A] right to contribution may arise in either of two ways: first, through the affirmative creation of a right of action by Congress, either expressly or by clear implication; or, second, through the power of federal courts to fashion a federal common law of contribution.”). The court has been provided with no basis for expanding the common law in this manner; Hal Lewis only argues that “the underlying purpose” of the TCPA would be furthered by such an expan-sion, but this is insufficient. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640 (noting that such instances “are ‘few and restricted,’ and fall into essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is ‘necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,’ and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law”) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) and citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 10 L.Ed.2d 605 (1963)). As a right of contribution in the TCPA is not necessary to protect uniquely federal interests, nor has the court been given the power to develop substantive law, the court declines to expand the federal common law in this way. Thus, the court grants SKA’s motion to dismiss to the extent that Hal Lewis seeks contribution for liability stemming from violations of the TCPA.