In Garrett v. Ragle Dental Laboratory, Inc., 2011 WL 2637227 (N.D.Ill. 2011), Judge Buklo held that since the TCPA arises under federal law, federal law controls whether indemnification arise.  In the absence of Congressional action providing an indemnity right, there is no indemnity right for TCPA claims. 


Ragle points out that no court has specifically held that the TCPA does not permit claims for indemnification and/or contribution. But this observation clearly does little to show that Congress has created an affirmative cause of action for contribution. Nor are the cases on which Ragle relies to the contrary. In G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Franklin Bank, S.S.B., No. 06 C 949, 2006 WL 2666289, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 14, 2006), for example, a claim for contribution was asserted in a case involving the TCPA; however, the court specifically declined to address the contention that the contribution claim was precluded by Donovan. In G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Finish Thompson, Inc., No. 07–5953 (N.D.Ill. March 18, 2008), the court merely granted a motion to file a third-party complaint in a TCPA case. Although the subsequently-filed complaint included a contribution claim, the question of whether the contribution claim was barred was never broached. Locklear Elec., Inc. v. Lay, No. 09–cv–0531–MJR, 2009 WL 4678428, at *1 (S.D.Ill.Dec. 7, 2009), makes no mention of contribution or indemnification.    To be sure, Donovan involved a claim under ERISA, not the TCPA. However, its holding has been applied to crossclaims involving numerous other federal statutes. See, e.g., Daniels v. Bursey, No. 03 C 1550, 2004 WL 1977402, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 10, 2004) (“There is no basis to believe that the general rule that federal law governs the right of contribution for damages assessed for violating federal statutes is restricted to ERISA violations.”); see also Equity Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Russell, 406 F.Supp.2d 882, 885 (N.D.Ill.2005) (Federal Copyright Act of 1976); Kay v. First Continental Trading, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 753, 756 (N .D. Ill.1997) (Fair Credit Reporting Act); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., No. 85 C 1142, 1987 WL 27368, at *2 (N.D.Ill.Dec. 4, 1987) (CERCLA). Ragle contends that the TCPA is different from other federal statutes because it expressly provides for state-court jurisdiction over claims arising under the Act. But the fact that states are permitted to hear TCPA claims does not mean that state contribution laws apply to such claims. The fact remains that Ragle seeks contribution for damages resulting from the violation of a federal statute. Consequently, federal law applies to its claims.    Ragle maintains that Cadent’s argument applies only to claims for contribution, and that Cadent has therefore failed to show that the claim for indemnification in Count I should be dismissed. But many cases have applied Donovan to both contribution and indemnification claims. See, e.g., Doherty v. Wireless Broadcasting Systems of Sacramento, Inc., 151 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir.1998) (“A defendant held liable under a federal statute has a right to indemnification or contribution from another only if such right arises: (1) through the affirmative creation of a right of action by Congress, either expressly or implicitly, or (2) under the federal common law.”);   Kudlicki v. MDMA, Inc., No. 05 C 2589, 2006 WL 1308617, at *3 (N.D.Ill. May 10, 2006). Thus, I grant Cadent’s motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of Counts I and II of Ragle’s crossclaim.