In Hutton v. C.B. Accts. Inc., 2010 WL 3021904 (C.D.Ill. 2010), Judge McCuskey held that a debt collector’s message on an answering machine constituted collection activity under the FDCPA even though no collection activities were mentioned, following the 7th Circuit’s recent decision in Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, —F.3d —-, 2010 WL 2899110, at *4 (7th Cir. 2010) and rejecting the California District Court’s Koby decision.
At least one federal court has held that certain types of voicemail messages do not constitute “communications” under the FDCPA. See Biggs v. Credit Collections, Inc., 2007 WL 4034997, at *4 (W.D.Okla. Nov. 15, 2007) (“The transcript of the voice mail messages demonstrates that the voice mails ‘convey[ed]’ no ‘information regarding a debt.’ ”). How-ever, most federal district courts treat such messages as “communications” under the FDCPA. See, e.g., Drossin v. Nat’l Action Financial Services, Inc., 641 F.Supp.2d 1314, 1320 (S.D.Fla.2009); Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 586 F.Supp.2d 1346, 1351 (N.D.Ga.2008); Ramirez, 567 F.Supp.2d at 1040-41; Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Associates, Inc., 387 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1116 (C.D.Cal.2005); Leyse v. Corporate Collection Services, Inc., 2006 WL 2708451, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006). ¶ The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently reiterated its position that the FDCPA does not establish “a categorical rule that only an explicit demand for payment will qualify as a communication made in connection with the collection of a debt.” Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, —F.3d —-, 2010 WL 2899110, at *4 (7th Cir. July 27, 2010). Determining whether something is a “communication” under the FDCPA involves looking at the would-be communication’s purpose, and the context in which it was made. Id. at *5. For example, in Horkey, the Seventh Circuit held that a message constituted a “communication” under the FDCPA be-cause the only reason the phone call had been made in the first place was to collect a debt. Horkey, 333 F.3d at 774. ¶ In the case at bar, Defendant’s argument that the messages it left for Plaintiff were not “communications” is without merit. Viewed in the context of the facts alleged in the Complaint and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the purpose of the messages was to induce Plaintiff to call Defendant to discuss her outstanding debt. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the voicemail messages were left to indirectly convey “information regarding [her] debt….” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). ¶ Defendant’s reliance on Koby v. ARS Nat’l Services, Inc., 2010 WL 1438763 (S.D.Cal. Mar. 29, 2010), is unavailing. Koby, an unpublished district court opin-ion from outside this Circuit, held that a voicemail message similar to the one at issue here was not a “communication” under the FDCPA because the message merely left the caller’s name and requested a return phone call. Koby, 2010 WL 1438763, at *4. The Koby court’s reasoning cannot be reconciled with the Seventh Circuit’s clear statement that the purpose and context of the communications are key factors in determining whether something is an FDCPA “communication.” See Gburek, 2010 WL 2899110, at *5; Horkey, 333 F.3d at 774. In this case, the only reason that Defendant called Plaintiff was to attempt to collect on her outstanding debt. Therefore, the Court declines Defendant’s invitation to rely on Koby and instead finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that the voicemail messages at issue were “communications” under the FDCPA. Defendant’s Motion is denied in this respect.