In Sullivan v. CTI Collection Services, 2009 WL 1587588 (M.D.Fla. 2009), Judge Moody held that threadbare recitals of the FDCPA fail to meet the pleading standard of FRCPs 8 and 12(b)(6).  Judge Moody explained: 



While the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Conley, it has explicitly rejected the language relied on by Plaintiff in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 563. The Supreme Court has recently clarified that in the post-Twombly world of pleading, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.1937 (2009).    Plaintiff is a consumer as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. 1692a(3), and according to Defendant, Plaintiff allegedly owes a debt as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. 1692a(5)….    8. Defendant is a debt collector as that term is defined by 15 U .S.C. 1692a(6), and sought to collect a consumer debt from Plaintiff.” (Dkt. # 1 p. 2) ¶  These seem to be exactly the type of threadbare recitals that the Supreme Court sought to prevent in Iqbal. Plaintiff has merely recited the elements of the action. The Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to provide a short and plain statement of the facts upon which relief may be granted.