We had hoped the issue would be addressed by the Supreme Court (as to RESPA) in Edwards v. First American Corp. 610 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 2010), but SCOTUS dismissed cert. as improvidently granted. So, the district court in Smith v. Microsoft Corp. 2012 WL 2975712 (S.D.Cal. 2012) addressed the issue whether a TCPA Plaintiff who otherwise had suffered no compensable loss other than the TCPA penalty conferred Article III standing. Judge Sammartino held that he had jurisdiction. First Judge Sammartino held that a TCPA Plaintiff need not show economic loss, such as increased cellular telephone charges or lost minutes in order to bring a TCPA claim. That said, Judge Sammartino held that such a TCPA Plaintiff still had cognizable injury under Article III, explaining:
Accordingly, based on the plain language of the TCPA and supported by the legislative history as set forth above, the Court finds that by alleging he received a text message in violation of the TCPA, Smith has established a particularized injury in satisfaction of Article III premised on the invasion of his privacy, even absent any economic harm. Courts interpreting other federal statutes aimed at curbing invasions of individual privacy with similarly broad private rights of action have arrived at the same conclusion. See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litigation, 2012 WL 2126351, at *7 (N.D.Cal. June 12, 2012) (holding that plaintiffs established injury in fact for the purposes of Article III standing by alleging a violation of their statutory rights under the Wiretap Act); In re Hulu Privacy Litigation, 2012 WL 2119193, at *8 (N.D.Cal. June 11, 2012) (“Plaintiffs establish an injury (and standing) by alleging a violation of [the Video Privacy Protection Act].”); Gaos v. Google, Inc., 2012 WL 1094646, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Mar.29, 2012) (“The SCA [Stored Communications Act] provides a right to judicial relief based only on a violation of the statute without additional injury. Thus, a violation of one’s statutory rights under the SCA is a concrete injury.”).