In Perez v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., No. 4:19-cv-07288-YGR, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118267, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021), Judge Gonzalez Rogers said that Duguid was not much help to an insurance carrier fighting a final TCPA judgment entered against its insured.

In this action, Ignacio Perez is now seeking to recover monies against Indian Harbor. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Perez brings one count of a breach of contract – a breach of the good faith and fair dealing provision – and seeks to recover the jury award plus interest. (Id. at 4-5.) The Court previously granted a motion to dismiss certain related defendants, denied a motion to stay, and granted in part and denied in part a motion to strike. (Dkt. No. 32.)  Now before the Court is Indian Harbor’s motion to reconsider the Court’s prior Order with respect to the denial of the motion to stay. (Dkt. No. 87.) Specifically, Indian Harbor contends that recent authority from the United States Supreme Court in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S.Ct. 1163, 209 L. Ed. 2d 272, 2021 WL 1215717 (U.S. 2021), warrant the staying of this case. In light of this recent intervening authority, the Court granted leave to Indian Harbor to file a motion for reconsideration. (Dkt. No. 84 (motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration), 85 (Order granting leave to file a motion for reconsideration).)  Having reviewed the parties’ briefing, and for the reasons set forth below, the motion for reconsideration and to stay the case is DENIED.  In short, Indian Harbor has not demonstrated the appropriateness of a stay in light of Duguid. The parties at minimum agree that Duguid will result in at least a reduction of the judgment in the Perez I matter in the amount of approximately $15,532,000, decreasing the total award from $267,349,000 to $251,817,000. Indian Harbor contends however that the entire judgement is unsound and therefore at risk of being entirely reversed and remanded back to this Court in light of Duguid. This is especially so, Indian Harbor contends, in light of California state authority which requires the exhaustion of all appeals for the finality of judgments.  Indian Harbor does not persuade. Indian Harbor does not demonstrate that the entire judgment is at risk from Duguid. At best, Duguid will require an approximately 5.8% reduction in the total damages amount. Indian Harbor does not otherwise show that Duguid would warrant the reversal of the remaining damages amount. Indian Harbor’s further reliance on California authority is misplaced. As the Court previously held, “unlike California state court judgments, federal judgments like the one in [Perez]’s prior federal action are deemed final when entered, even if an appeal is pending.” Liu v. Levinson, 17-cv–5384-JSW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235766, 2018 WL 10604346, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) (citing Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2006)). This contrasts to California state law, where “a judgment is not final during the pendency of and until the resolution of an appeal.” Louen v. City of Fresno, 1:04-cv-06556-OWW SMS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59998, 2007 WL 2288321, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007) (citing Sosa, 437 F.3d at 928).