In Marlin v. Chase Cardmember Services, Inc. 2009 WL 1405196 (E.D.Cal. 2009), Judge Beck held that, in an FDCPA case, a counter-claim for the debt is permissive, rather than compulsory.  Judge Beck explained:


However, although the Ninth Circuit has not specifically decided whether a counterclaim for the underlying debt in an FDCPA action is compulsory or permissive, most, if not all of the district courts within the Ninth Circuit, including this Court, have determined that such a counterclaim is permissive. See eg., Koumarin v. Chase Bank USA, 2008 WL 5120053 (N.D.Cal.2008); Avery v. First Resoluation Mgmt. Corp., 2007 WL 1560653 (D.Or.2007); Moore v. Old Canal Financial Corp., 2006 WL 851114 (D.Idaho 2006); Sparrow v. Mazda American Credit, 385 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1068 (E.D.Cal.2005); Campos v. Western Dental Srvs., Inc., 404 F.Supp.2d 1164 (N.D.Cal.2005).    In Sparrow, this Court determined that the counter-claim for the underlying debt in an FDCPA action was not compulsory because “[w]hile the debt does provide some factual connection between the claims, because they arise out of the debt, the legal issues and evidence relating to the claims are considered sufficiently distinct so as not to meet the ‘logical relationship’ test.” Sparrow at 1068.For example, the issues raised by each claim were distinct, the evidence needed to support each claim differed, and the claims were not related on a “transactional” level. Id.  The Court agrees with the above authority and finds that the counterclaims are permissive.