In Carson v. Bank of America, N.A., 2012 WL 5041359 (E.D.Cal. 2012), Judge Englund found that FCRA pre-empted Plaintiff’s tort claims for false light and invasion of privacy.
Plaintiffs’ seventh claim is for false light invasion of privacy. Plaintiffs allege, specifically, that Defendant “reported Plaintiffs late on their mortgage payments, when they were not in fact late, and initiating foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiffs’ property when they were not in default on the loan,” and these false reports placed Plaintiffs in a false light. (ECF No. 15 at 19.) “The elements of the tort of false light invasion of privacy are 1) the defendant caused to be generated publicity of the plaintiff that was false or misleading; 2) the publicity was offensive to a reasonable person; and 3) the defendant acted with actual malice.” Flores v. Von Kleist, 739 F.Supp.2d 1236, 1259 (E.D.Cal.2010). ¶ Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ false light claim is preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). The FCRA requires credit reporting agencies to adopt reasonable procedures related to the collection, communication, and use of consumer credit information to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e; Roybal v. Equifax, 405 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1181 (E.D.Cal.2005). In furtherance of these goals, the FCRA places two types of duties on those furnishing information to credit reporting agen-cies. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2; Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153–54 (9th Cir.2009). Subsection 2(a) “details the duty ‘to provide accurate information ….’ ” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a). Subsection 2(b) imposes the duty that upon notice of dispute, “that is, when a person who furnished information to a CRA receives notice from the CRA that the consumer disputes the information,” the furnisher of the information shall conduct an investigation and compile a report “with respect to the disputed information.” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b)). ¶ While there is a private right of action under subsection (b), there is no such private right under subsection (a). Miller v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:11–cv–02588–MMA, 2012 WL 871321, *5 (S.D.Cal. March 14, 2012). ¶ Subsection 2(b) appears to provide the exclusive remedy for acts that constitute violations of the FCRA, because Congress, “in an effort to maintain a uniform set of duties across all furnishers of credit information … included an express preemption clause in the FCRA.” Id. (citing Gorman, 584 F.3d at 113; 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F)). Section 1681t(b)(1)(F) “precludes states from imposing requirements or pro-hibitions on furnishers’ duties to report accurately and correct identified discrepancies as set forth in section 1681s–2.” Id. “The district courts read the FCRA’s preemption clause to preclude all state common law and statutory claims, to effect Congress’ intent to limit a plaintiff’s recovery against furnishers of credit in-formation to only the remedies provided under the FCRA.” Id. (citing Howard v. Blue Ridge Bank, 371 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1144 (N.D.Cal.2005); Guillen v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 5:10–cv–05825–EJD, 2011 WL 4071996 *6, (N.D.Cal. Aug.31, 2011)). ¶ Accordingly, the FCRA preempts Plaintiffs’ common law claim for false light invasion of privacy, as the claim is based on Defendant allegedly reporting false credit information to a credit reporting agency. Plaintiffs therefore fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ false light invasion of privacy claim is granted.