In Crehin v. ARS Nat. Services, 2014 WL 104073 (C.D.Cal. 2014), Judge Wilson found that a collection agency had a permissible to pull an alleged debtor’s credit report, notwithstanding the debtor’s dispute as to whether or not he was not a debtor.

However, one of the permissible purposes for obtaining an individual’s credit report is if the entity requesting the report “intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added); Cal. Civ.Code § 1785.11(a)(3) (A) (same).  ¶  Courts have held that 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) applies to collection agencies seeking to collect on delinquent accounts. See Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 34 (3d Cir.2011) (holding that accessing a consumer’s credit report for purposes of collecting a debt is a permissible purpose); Jacques v. Solomon & Solomon P.C., 886 F.Supp.2d 429, 434 (D.Del.2012) (same); Pyle v. First Nat. Collection Bureau, 2012 WL 1413970 at *3 (E.D.Cal. Apr.23, 2012) (“A collection agency is permitted to obtain a consumer report if the agency is doing so for the purposes of collecting a debt.”). These cases are also persuasive in interpreting California’s credit reporting act. See Olson v. Six Rivers Nat. Bank, 111 Cal.App.4th 1, 12, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 (2003) (“Because [California’s] Credit Reporting Act is substantially based on the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, judicial interpretation of the federal provisions is persuasive authority and entitled to substantial weight when interpreting the California provisions.”). ¶  Because Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that Defendant is a collections agency, and that Defendant “was attempting to collect” a debt when it reviewed Plaintiff’s credit report, (Compl., ¶¶ 22, 27), Defendants actions would likely be permitted under both the FCRA and the CCRAA. Although the complaint avers that no such debt existed, if Defendant “was attempting to collect” a debt, as the complaint states, Defendant’s actions would be permitted even if Plaintiff did not in fact have such a debt. Both the FCRA and the CCRAA focus on whether the entity pulling the credit report “intends” to use the information in connection with collecting a debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3)(A); Cal. Civ.Code § 1785.11(a)(3)(A). A good faith belief that a debt exists is thus sufficient to satisfy these provisions. See Trikas v. Universal Card Services Corp., 351 F.Supp.2d 37, 42 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (“[T]he plain language of [15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3)(A) ] … focuses on the intent of the party obtaining the consumer report.” (emphasis in original)); Korotki v. Attorney Services Corp., 931 F.Supp. 1269, 1276 (D.Md.1996) (“[S]o long as a user has reason to believe that a permissible purpose exists, that user may obtain a consumer report without violating the FCRA.”); Myers v. Stoneleigh Recovery Assocs., 2012 WL 1356752 at *5–6 (E.D.Cal. Apr.18, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s FCRA claim even though the complaint stated that plaintiff did not owe the debt at issue because the complaint also stated that defendant was attempting to collect a debt from plaintiff). Because the complaint does not include any factual allegations suggesting that Defendant’s intent in pulling Plaintiff’s credit report was not to collect a debt, Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a plausible claim for relief.  ¶  For the foregoing reasons, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 21 days of this order. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of the case with prejudice.