In Godinez v. Law Offices of Clark Garen, 2016 WL 4059718, at *1 (C.D.Cal., 2016), Judge Carney dismissed a state law debt collection counter claim filed in response to an FDCPA action because the debt collection claim was permissive, not compulsory.
Godinez claims that Defendants violated the FDCPA and the RFDCPA by engaging in unlawful debt collection practices, and Best Service’s counterclaims allege that that Plaintiff violated the terms of an agreement assigned to Best Service. These claims clearly have something in common; they both ultimately relate to Plaintiff’s alleged debt. But they do not “arise[ ] from the same aggregate set of operative facts” such that Best Service’s counterclaim is compulsory. See Lazar, 237 F.3d at 967. A number of district courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that actions to collect on debts are not compulsory counterclaims in FDCPA actions. See, e.g., Marlin v. Chase Cardmember Servs., No. 1:09cv0192 AWI DLB, 2009 WL 1405196, at * 3 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2009) (“[M]ost, if not all of the district courts within the Ninth Circuit … have determined that [a counterclaim to collect on a debt in an FDCPA action] is permissive” (collecting cases).); Martin v. Law Offices of John F. Edwards, 262 F.R.D. 534, 537 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that “the majority of courts in the Ninth Circuit” have found that collection counterclaims in FDCPA actions are permissive (collecting cases)); Sparrow v. Mazda Am. Credit, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that a counterclaim to collect on a debt in an FDCPA action was not compulsory because “[w]hether a plaintiff in an unfair debt collection practices action actually has outstanding debt is irrelevant to the merits of that claim”). Best Service’s counterclaims are permissive as opposed to compulsory.