In Keshishian v. AFNI Inc., 2012 WL 5378819 (C.D.Cal. 2012), Judge Feess dismissed Plaintiff’s claims as improvidently pleaded.  Plaintiff Marine A. Keshishian alleges that Defendants Afni, Inc., Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC, Equable Ascent Financial, LLC (“Equable”), and Union Adjustment Company, Inc. are engaged in unfair debt collection practices. (Docket No. 3 [Compl.].) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges violations of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“the Rosenthal Act”), the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), and California’s Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCCRAA”). (Id.) She seeks actual damages, statutory damages, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, punitive damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. (Id. at 12.) Judge Feess found that Plaintiff failed to meet the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard to plead a proper Rosenthal Act claim, and found no private right of action under FCRA (15 U.S.C. § 1682s-2(a).  Judge Feess also found Plaintiff’s CCRAA claim pre-empted:

Defendant argues that “the FCRA preempts any state law claim that implicates the duty of a furnisher to transmit accurate information to a CRA” and that Plaintiff’s claims under the CCCRAA are therefore preempted. (Mem. at 12.) Defendant points to FCRA’s preemption provisions, set forth in section 1681h(e) and section 1681t(b)(1)(F), in support of this proposition. (Id.) . . .¶  The Ninth Circuit has not explicitly addressed the apparent tension between the two provisions. Absent further direction from the Court of Appeals on the issue, the “majority [of district courts have] favored the ‘total preemption’ approach, determining that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) totally preempts all ‘state statutory and common law causes of actions which fall within the conduct proscribed under § 1681s–2.’ “ Buraye, 625 F.Supp.2d at 899 (citing a number of district courts cases that have reached this conclusion). Based on this reasoning, Judge Morrow in the Central District of California held in Buraye v. Equifax that a plaintiff’s CCCRAA claims were preempted by FCRA, noting that this conclusion was “consistent with the expressed intent of Congress to have the conduct of furnishers of information regulated exclusively by governmental entities.” Id. at 902 (quoting Potter v. Illinois Student Assistance Comm’n, D 04–2493, 2004 WL 1203156, *6 (Cal.App. June 2, 2004)). The Court finds Judge Morrow’s reasoning persuasive.

Finally, Judge Feess refused to allow leave to amend, with some choice words about the request:

Plaintiff’s initial Complaint contains such a patent lack of specificity that it appears designed to thwart a Defendant’s ability to provide an adequate response. In lieu of making allegations with respect to each of the four named Defendants, Plaintiff merely includes a brief section in the Complaint entitled “Facts Com-mon to All Counts” in which Plaintiff makes vague, sweeping allegations with respect to all of the De-fendants. And these allegations do not even appear until the fifth page of the Complaint. Instead, the Complaint essentially reads like the first few pages of an introductory treatise on the FDCPA, Rosenthal Act, FCRA, and CCCRAA, providing very little information about the Defendants. Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel even appears to forget the name of his own client at one point in the Complaint, referring to “Plaintiff Atabekyan” instead of Plaintiff Keshishian, who is the sole plaintiff in this case. The Complaint can be characterized as sloppy at best and deliberately opaque at its worst. ¶  Plaintiff cannot file a deficient initial com-plaint designed to impede Defendant’s ability to respond, ignore the Court’s deadlines for amending her Complaint and opposing Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, offer no explanation as to why she was unable to respond within the requisite time frame, and then expect the Court to grant leave to amend. Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a First Amended Complaint is therefore DENIED.