In Marshall v. Mechs. Bank Auto Fin., No. 2:22-cv-06973-MCS-KS, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26934, at *4-7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2023), Judge Scarsi dismissed what he called a ‘redemptionist’ claim against a bank.
The section of the FAC outlining the basis upon which this [*5] Court may exercise jurisdiction cites provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code; Public Law No. 73-10, which “suspended the gold standard in the United States,” Coppedge v. PNC Bank, No. 18-2123, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237213 , 2018 WL 10811876, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2018); 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(2), which grants the President the wartime authority to regulate “[a]ny payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery of property or interest, made to or for the account of the United States”; and 31 U.S.C. § 3123, which requires the United States “to pay, in legal tender, principal and interest on the obligations of the Government.” (FAC 3.) None of these citations has any rational relation to a disputed auto loan. Consequently, the Court agrees with Defendants that certain claims of the FAC “bear the hallmarks of the ‘Redemptionist'” theory of liability. (Mot. 2.) [T]he “Redemptionist” theory . . . propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the “strawman.” The “strawman” purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in , and, instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country’s national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. . . . Adherents of this scheme also advocate that [individuals] copyright their names to justify filing liens against officials using their names in public records such as indictments or court papers. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s references to “legal tender,” “fiat currency,” and “federal reserve notes” strongly suggest his claims are premised on a “Redemptionist” theory, as adherents posit that no debt incurred following the United States’ transition from the gold standard is valid because any loan would not be based on “legal tender” but would instead consist of federal reserve notes which have no value. See Lawson v. CitiCorp Tr. Bank, FSB, No. 2:11-cv-01163 KJM KJN PS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86780, 2011 WL 3439223, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011), aff’d, 576 F. App’x 696 (9th Cir. 2014). Finally, courts have recognized that “redemptionists theories . . . propound that through machinations of the Uniform Commercial Code, a citizen may contract for debt but never have to pay anything.” Podgorny v. Ally Fin., No. CV-21-00288-PHX-DJH, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39758, 2022 WL 672676, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2022). “Theories presented by redemptionist . . . adherents have not only been rejected by the courts, but also recognized as frivolous and a waste of court resources.” Liles v. Skiles, No. 2:22-cv-00004-DCN, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139567, 2022 WL 3101620, at *4 (D. Idaho Aug. 4, 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, Plaintiff’s “common law & UCC” and “trademark violation” claims are DISMISSED without leave to amend.