In Begg v. Dell Financial Services, L.L.C., 2010 WL 3909914 (S.D.Cal. 2010), Judge Benitez defined the “intrusion on seclusion” tort in the FDCPA context, finding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim.


“To prove actionable intrusion, the plaintiff must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff. The tort is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data source.” Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc., 18 Cal.4th 200, 232 (1998). Here, Plaintiff fails to identify any zone of privacy that Chase allegedly invaded. In particular, Plaintiff fails to identify where he received Chase’s calls, i.e., whether he received the calls on his home phone, work phone, cell phone, or other phone. Without this information, it is impossible to determine whether a zone of privacy existed.    As to the second element, Plaintiff’s claim is like-wise deficient. In determining whether a plaintiff sufficiently pleads “highly offensive” conduct, the Court considers: “the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.” Detersa v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 465 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 1 (1994)). In this case, the Complaint fails to identify when the calls were made or the content of the calls. It is also unclear whether Plaintiff even answered the calls or spoke with someone from Chase. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege “highly offensive” conduct by Chase.     In light of the above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action fails to state sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of Plaintiff s privacy claim against Chase.