In Flint v. Beneficial Financial I Inc., 2013 WL 552622 (E.D.Cal. 2013), Judge Burrell declined to award reverse-attorneys’ fees under the FDCPA without more than conclusory statements of bad faith.

Further, Defendant has not shown that sanctions should be awarded under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), which requires “a finding by the court that [Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim] was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (emphasis added). Defendant does not assert that Plaintiff’s purpose in filing the FDCPA claim was to harass. (See Def.’s Mot.) Instead, “Defendant asserts that [P]laintiff’s FDCPA claim was frivolous and brought ‘recklessly’ and without either substantial factual or legal support.” (Id. 2:7–8.) Defendant “offers no evidence, other than its conclusory assertion[s] that [Plaintiff’s claim is] frivolous[, reckless, and without factual or legal support], to support a finding that [Plaintiff]’s claim[was] necessarily brought … with the purpose of harassing [Defendant] .” Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 940–41 (9th Cir.2007); see also Bonner v. Redwood Mortg. Corp., No. C 10–00479 WHA, 2010 WL 2528962, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2010) (“Defendants’ conclusory assertion that plaintiff’s purpose was to harass does not entitle them to attorney’s fees under the federal Debt Collection Practices Act.”). For the reason stated, the motion does not satisfy the 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) standard and is denied.