Yes, it’s a bit far afield but Judge Chen confirmed the basic principle under California law that the CLRA does not regulate financial products, a principle that the Plaintiff’s bar continues to test. In Kissing v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc, 2015 WL 7283038, at *3-5 (N.D.Cal., 2015), Judge Chen held that vacation timeshares are not “goods” or “services” under the CLRA.
The CLRA protects against unfair competition and deceptive practices intending to result in the sale or lease of “goods” or “services” to any consumer. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). Defendants argue that the Plaintiff does not have a claim under the CLRA because timeshare points do not fall under the Act«s? definition of “goods” or “services.” . . . The California Supreme Court has not addressed whether timeshare points fall within the CLRA’s definition of goods or services. See Wixon v. Wyndham Resort Dev. Corp., No. C 07-02361 (JSW), 2008 WL 1777590, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2008). However, the Northern District of California and California Court of Appeal have held that timeshare points do not fall within the CLRA«s? definition of “goods” or “services.” . . . .Like Wixon and Boling, the Court finds that timeshare points are not “goods” under the CLRA. . . . As conceded by Plaintiff at the hearing and in his papers, timeshare points are an interest in real property, which is not covered by the CLRA«s? definition of goods. It is undisputed that in this case, Plaintiff”s purchase of timeshare points came with a deed of trust. Thus, Plaintiff’s rights emanate from a purchase of real property, not tangible chattels. Opp. at 7. See also Boling, 2005 WL 1186519, at *4-5 (“The memberships sold by defendant constituted incorporeal rights in real property. [Citation] ¶ Consequently, the trial court properly dismissed the first cause of action on the ground it lacked merit.”) . . . Plaintiff’s reliance on Hernandez v. Hilltop Financial Mortgage, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 842 (N.D. Cal. 2007) likewise fails. There, the court held that the financial services rendered by the defendant were sufficient to constitute a “service” under the CLRA. Id. at 851. Although the extension of a credit line usually did not fall under the CLRA«s? definition of a “service” (because the issuing of a credit line alone is not work or labor or related to the sale or repair of a tangible chattel) the court in Hernandez determined that the totality of the services provided were indeed a “service” under the CLRA because the defendant provided assistance in developing, securing, and managing an acceptable refinancing plan so that the plaintiffs could remain in possession of their home, along with the credit line. See id. In contrast, there is no allegation that Defendants provided Plaintiff with any “services” other than the sale of the timeshare points that goes beyond that sale and into a level of ancillary services attendant to the use of the vacation unit. The core value of the timeshare points is the interest in and use of real estate, not e.g., housekeeping services incidental thereto. Consequently, timeshare points do not fall under the CLRA’s definition of “goods” or “services.” For this reason, the Court dismisses the CLRA claim with prejudice.