In Frezza v. Google Inc., 2012 WL 5877587 (N.D.Cal. (2012), Judge Whyte held (in evaluating Google’s ‘tag’ program) that the CLRA applies only to consumer transactions, and does not apply to business transactions.

The court first looks to whether plaintiffs even qualify as consumers for protection under the CLRA. A violation of the CLRA may only be alleged by a consumer. Von Grabe v. Sprint PCS, 312 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1303 (S.D.Cal.2003). Both Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Frezza acknowledged that they signed up for Google Tags accounts for business purposes. Mr. Rodriguez signed up for Google Tags “in order to promote the services of his employer, an auto dealership.” Compl. ¶ 19. Likewise, Ms. Frezza “hoped to use the Google Tags service to better advertise her small holistic healing business.” Compl. ¶ 22. Additionally, the complaint is replete with references to how Tags was a service designed for businesses and merchants. E.g., id. ¶ 11–13. Because the complaint makes clear that plaintiffs signed up for Tags for business purposes and not personal, family, or household purposes, they do not qualify as “consumers” protected under the CLRA. Plaintiffs argue that the statute “is to be liberally construed.” While this may be true, the statute is intended to protect consumers, not those who make purchases for business purposes. See Zepeda v. PayPal, Inc., 777 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1222 (N.D.Cal.2011). Accordingly, the court grants Google’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ CLRA claim. See id. (dismissing plaintiffs’ CLRA claim where plaintiffs did not qualify as consumers for purposes of the statute because they had alleged they were “sellers” and had “sellers” business accounts). Because it does not appear that plaintiffs could amend to allege that they are, in fact, consumers, this claim is dismissed with prejudice.