In Lauren Cummings v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 2017 WL 977574, at *4–5 (D.Ariz., 2017), the District Court granted summary judgment under the FDCPA because the misstatement of the debt was not material under 9th Circuit precedent.
The Court finds that Ninth Circuit precedent controls the facts of this case in favor of Defendant. Under the FDCPA, § 1692e prohibits the use by a debt collector of “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Section 1692e(2) prohibits “[t]he false representation of…the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” Section 1692f prohibits a debt collector from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” “The collection of any amount…unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law” is a violation of § 1692f(1). Whether conduct violates §§ 1692e or 1692f requires an objective analysis that takes into account whether “the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by a communication.” See Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, at no time did Defendant make a demand or seek to collect from Plaintiff any amount of money that was greater than what Plaintiff owed, it just failed to include a missing $20 late charge that was shortly thereafter included in Defendant’s amended complaint. Under these facts, the Court finds that the purpose of the FDCPA is not furthered by creating liability as to immaterial information. See Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1033 (finding that if a statement would not mislead an unsophisticated consumer it does not violate §§ 1692e or 1692f, even if it is false in some technical sense); see also Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 556 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[Plaintiff] can’t win simply by showing that [the debt collector’s] use of the term ‘principal balance’ is false in a technical sense; she has to show that it would mislead the unsophisticated consumer”). The Court further finds that in order for there to be a violation of §§ 1692e or 1692f, the alleged falsity of the representation must actually distort the consumer’s perception, not a minor technical glitch that even the least sophisticated consumer could understand. See Isham v. Gurstel, Staloch & Chargo, P.A., 738 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (D. Ariz. 2010). Here, the alleged “falsity” was nothing more than a $20 “technical glitch” that does not result in a legal violation. Plaintiff was able to intelligently choose her action concerning her debt based on the information presented to her both in the demand letter, the original complaint, and the amended complaint. The omission of $20.00 from the original complaint was simply not a material misrepresentation, and would be not be meaningful to the “least sophisticated debtor.” See Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 934.