In Midland Funding, LLC v. Pipkin, — P.3d —-, 2012 WL 2849295 (Utah App.), 2012 UT App 185 (2012), the Court of Appeal catalogued the caselaw holding that an FDCPA violation is not a defense to the underlying debt itself or, conversely, that FDCPA compliance is not a pre-condition to collection on the obligation.

Pipkin also argues that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( FDCPA), see generally 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692–1692p (2009 & Supp.2012), precluded Midland from filing a collection action against Pipkin until Pipkin received information that he timely requested from Midland regarding the debt in accordance with the terms of the initial col-lection letter Midland sent Pipkin. The letter stated that Midland would “suspend [its] ef-forts to collect the debt (through a lawsuit, arbitration or otherwise) until [it] mail[ed] the requested information to [Pipkin],” pursuant to the FDCPA. See generally id. § 1692g(b) (2009) (“If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.”); id. § 1692k(a) (“[A]ny debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person….”). While Midland’s alleged failure to comply with the FDCPA may subject it to liability under the act, such failure is not a defense to liability for the underlying debt. See Balsly v. West Mich. Debt Collections, Inc., No. 3:11cv642–DJN, 2012 WL 628490, at *12 (E.D.Va. Feb. 27, 2012) (mem.) (“Pursuant to the FDCPA, [the alleged debtor] has a right to pursue his claim regardless of whether he is found liable on the debt …—the two rights are not coterminous.”); United States v. Iwanski, 805 F.Supp.2d 1355, 1359 (S.D.Fla.2011) (“[A] violation of th[e FDCPA] does not relieve Defendant of his obligation to pay the underlying debt.”); Vitullo v. Mancini, 684 F.Supp.2d 760, 765 (E.D.Va.2010) (mem.) (“Nothing in the FDCPA suggests, explicitly or implicitly, that debtors might seek declaratory judgments cancelling or extinguishing accrued debts, in lieu of damages, for FDCPA violations ….”); see also Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1178 (6th Cir.1999); Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir.1998); McCartney v. First City Bank, 970 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir.1992) (“ ‘The [ FDCPA] is designed to protect consumers who have been victimized by unscrupulous debt collectors, regardless of whether a valid debt actually exists.’ “ (quoting Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir.1982))); Torres v. ProCollect, Inc., No. 11–cv–02989–LTB, 2012 WL 1969280, at *3 (D. Colo. June 1, 2012) (mem.); Kolker v. Duke City Collection Agency, 750 F.Supp. 468, 471 (D.N.M.1990) (mem.). Furthermore, because Pipkin only barely referenced the FDCPA in his previous filings—i.e, his Answer does not contain any reference to the FDCPA, though he presents this argument as a defense to Midland’s claims—his argument that he never received the requested documentation is not appropriately before this court. Accordingly, we do not address Pipkin’s FDCPA arguments.