In Wynns v. Barclays Bank Delaware, 2015 WL 9016604, at *1 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., 2015) (unpublished), the California Court of Appeal said the Monopoly rules don’t apply – a debtor can’t write an restrictive endorsement on a check and get out of the debt.
This case arises from a $900 credit card debt incurred by pro se appellant George S. Wynns with respondent Barclays Bank Delaware (Barclays). Wynns contends that an accord and satisfaction of the debt was reached when Barclays negotiated his check with a “payment in full” restrictive endorsement for a lesser amount. Barclays took a different view and continued to bill Wynns for what it considered to be the delinquent account balance. Wynns sued Barclays for breach of contract, declaratory relief, and violation of Civil Code section 1785.25. The trial court granted summary judgment for Barclays. We affirm.
The Court of Appeal confirmed: “You can’t do that”.
The trial court here found, among other things, that no accord and satisfaction had occurred because there was no genuine dispute to be resolved. We reach the same conclusion. . . .Wynns’s “dispute” with Barclays was based on his contention that the Credit CARD Act required Barclays to periodically review his creditworthiness, and to “adjust the interest rate accordingly if the borrower merits a lower interest rate.” In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, he did not contend, and does not contend here, that the Credit CARD Act in fact supports his position. It seems clear that it does not, and that the 17.99 percent rate charged to Wynns’s account balance was in compliance with the requirements of the Credit CARD Act. We note that Wynns’s arguments attempt to dichotomize the terms “bona fide” and “dispute.” Here Barclays received nothing different from what it was already entitled to receive under the Agreement. . . . Wynns’s insistence that his restrictive endorsement on his check precluded application of the amount to his account ignores the Agreement terms, which allow Barclays to do just that. This argument again seems to rest upon the premise that his check could not be considered a “payment” subject to the terms of the Agreement because nothing was immediately due on the date of delivery—a premise we have already rejected.