In Mott v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-15744, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 16085 (9th Cir. May 28, 2021), the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of an FDCPA case in an unpublished decision.

Mott points to two letters, sent on February 23, 2016 and March 17, 2016, in which Trojan specified an 8.63 percent interest rate, when, based on the Note, the interest rate should have been 8.625 percent. We find Trojan’s minor misrepresentations as to the interest rate immaterial. “We have consistently held that whether conduct violates [the FDCPA] requires an objective analysis that considers whether the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by a communication.” Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[F]alse but non-material representations are not likely to mislead the least sophisticated consumer and therefore are not actionable under [section] 1692e.” Id. Importantly here, Mott does not contend that Trojan’s letters miscalculated the total debt he owed or that he was ever charged the microscopically higher interest rate stated in the February 23 and March 17 letters. We find that these minor misrepresentations could not reasonably have misled Mott. This is especially true given that Mott received two subsequent letters, on March 24, 2016 and July 20, 2016, which reflected the correct 8.625 percent interest rate. HN5 To create liability based on such immaterial information would undercut the purpose of the FDCPA. See Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1033-34; see also Afewerki v. Anaya L. Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 776 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Immaterial false representations . . . are those that are literally false, but meaningful only to the hypertechnical reader.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).