In Mattson v. New Penn Fin., LLC, No. 21-35795, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 7070, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2023), the Court of Appeals reviewed a District Court’s denial of class certification in a TCPA case because of factual questions amongst the class as to whether the residential lines were for residential or business use.  But, after the District Court did so, the 9th Circuit had issued its opinion in Chennette, holding that residential lines were “presumptively” for residential use. Here, the 9th Circuit therefore remanded the action for the District Court to consider its denial of class certification in light of Chennette.

This Court will uphold a class certification decision unless the district court “identified or applied the incorrect legal rule or its resolution of the motion resulted from a factual finding that was illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” Castillo v. Bank of Am.,NA, 980 F.3d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). We vacate the district court’sdecision and remand with instructions to consider our holding in Chennette, Inc., 50 F.4th 1217 (9th Cir. 2022). In denying Mattson class certification, the district court concluded that Mattson could not meet multiple requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) because individual questions concerning whether he is a “residential subscriber subject to the TCPA’s protections [would] predominate the litigation.” After the district court reached that conclusion and we heard argument, another panel of this Court issued a separate ruling in Chennette that touched on issues relevant to this litigation. Chennette held, in particular, that “registered cell phones that are used for both personal and business purposes are presumptively ‘residential’ within the meaning of” the relevant section of the TCPA. Chennette, 50 F.4th at 1225. With that ruling in mind, we ordered supplemental briefing to address Chennette’s impact on this case. The district court, however, did not have the benefit of Chennette when it denied class certification. We thus decline to apply the new legal standard in the first instance. Cf. Strategic Diversity, Inc. v. AlchemixCorp., 666 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing our precedent as “noting the prudence of remand in light of recent Supreme Court authority”); HorphagRsch. Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding to district court due to intervening authority). We vacate and remand for further proceedings in light of Chennette.