In In re Baroni, 2015 WL 6956664, at *12 (9th Cir.BAP (Cal.), 2015), the 9th Circuit BAP found that a debt secured by investment property was not an consumer “debt” under the FDCPA.
As a second alternate theory for granting summary judgment against Allana on her FDCPA claim, the bankruptcy court held that the Carmel refinancing loan was not a “debt” covered by the FDCPA. We agree. Under the FDCPA, a “debt” is defined as: “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes…. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (emphasis added); see also Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 874–75 (7th Cir.2000); Bloom v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 972 F.2d 1067, 1068 (9th Cir.1992). Here, the summary judgment record establishes that the Carmel loan was used to refinance the Carmel property, and in her bankruptcy filings, Allana repeatedly admitted that the Carmel property was not used as the Baronis’ residence, but rather was used as a rental property to generate income.12 Under these circumstances, we hold that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that the Carmel refinancing loan was not a debt covered by the FDCPA. Cf. Miller, 214 F.3d at 874–75 (indicating that a loan used to refinance property that at the time of the transaction is used as a rental property to generate income is not covered by the FDCPA). Thus, on this basis, the bankruptcy court correctly granted Nationstar summary judgment on Allana’s FDCPA claim