The 3rd Circuit upheld a summary judgment ruling that dismissed a putative class action against a law firm:

Candace Moyer brought a putative class action against Patenaude  &  Felix,  A.P.C.  under  the  Fair  Debt  Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) after Patenaude sent her a collection letter inviting her to “eliminate further collection action” by calling  Patenaude.  Moyer  claimed  that  this  invitation  to  call  Patenaude (1) deceives debtors by making them think a phone call is a “legally effective” means of ceasing collection activity, and (2) makes debtors uncertain about their right to dispute a  debt  in  writing.  Moyer’s  claims  fail,  so  we  will affirm  the District  Court’s  grant  of  summary  judgment in  favor  of Patenaude.

The court held language in the letter at issue saying the plaintiff could call to “eliminate further collection action” was not deceptive:

Moyer first contends that the letter is a deceptive means of debt collection in violation of §1692e(10) because Patenaude indicated that a phone call was a “legally effective” means of stopping collection activity. Appellant’s Br. 13. Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to “cease all collection efforts if  the consumer provides  written  notice” that she disputes the debt. Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354. A phone call from a debtor would not legally require Patenaude to cease collection efforts. But, according to Moyer, Patenaude’s  invitation  to “eliminate” collection action through a phone  call would deceive a debtor  into believing that the call would, by law, require collection efforts to cease.

Moyer’s argument  fails  because Patenaude never claimed the phone call was a “legally effective” means of stop-ping  collection  efforts. Patenaude invited Moyer to call  to “eliminate” collection action, but never asserted, explicitly or implicitly, that the phone call would, by law, force Patenaude to cease its collection efforts. Moyer reads into the invitation an implication that it does not create. For this reason, the district court decisions cited by Moyer are inapposite. They each involve a debt collector who did state that a phone call would legally require collection activity to cease. See, e.g., Langley v. Weinstein & Riley, P.S., No. H-12-1562, 2013 WL 2951057, at *5, 7–8 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2013)(holding that a debtor collector’s letter was deceptive when the letter stated that “the law requires [the debt collector] to suspend its [collection] efforts” if the debtor placed a phone call with the debt collector).

The court also held the language was not confusing:

Moyer next contends  that Patenaude’s  insertion  of the invitation to call in the Contact Sentence before the Validation Notice causes confusion  regarding  how  to  pursue  her  rights contained in the Validation Notice. According to Moyer, when an invitation  to  call appears  directly  before an  acknowledgment that the debtor  can  write  to  exercise  her  rights  under §1692g, the debtor would be left uncertain about whether she should call or write to exercise her rights.

Moyer sees confusion where  none  exists. The Validation  Notice  instructs the  debtor to  write to exercise their §1692g rights, leaving no suggestions that a phone call would suffice. Likewise, the Contact Sentence does not suggest that a debtor could exercise any §1692g rights over the phone. And the  order  of  the paragraphs  does  not  create  confusion  about what each one conveys. See Wilson, 225 F.3d at 356 (holding that a paragraph demanding immediate payment of a debt that preceded a Validation  Notice  did  not  create  “an  actual  or apparent contradiction” with the Validation Notice in violation of §1692g).