In Reyes v. Lincoln Automotive Financial Services, Inc., 2017 WL 2675363, at *6 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 2017), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held:
We are sensitive to the argument that businesses may undermine the effectiveness of the TCPA by inserting “consent” clauses of the type signed by Reyes into standard sales contracts, thereby making revocation impossible in many instances. See, e.g., Skinner v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., No. 3:14–CV–256–CWR–FKB, 2015 WL 4135269, at *3 (S.D. Miss. July 8, 2015). But this hypothetical concern, if valid, is grounded in public policy considerations rather than legal ones; if the abuse came to pass, it would therefore be “for the Congress to resolve—not the courts.” Atl. City Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc). We are not free to substitute our own policy preferences for those of the legislature by reading a right to revoke contractual consent into the TCPA where Congress has provided none.