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Defendant, a vision insurance provider, terminated plaintiff, an optometrist, for using unapproved lens suppliers for defendant's patients.  Defendant's network doctor agreement provided for a two-step review process of disputes, including those over termination under these circumstances.  The first step was review by a three-member panel, the second step was arbitration.  This decision holds that this two-step process does not violate… Read More

Lab. Code 432.7 prohibits an employer from asking a job applicant to disclose any conviction that has been judicially dismissed and bars an employer from using any record of a dismissed conviction as a factor in the termination of employment.  Here, Premier hired plaintiff but several weeks later received a mistaken notice from the DMV saying that plaintiff had an… Read More

The NLRA did not preempt plaintiff employees' claims that Google's (and its emplyment agency's) policies forbidding employees from disclosing their wages and working conditions to others violated various Labor Code sections giving rise to plaintiff's PAGA suit.  The NLRA did not arguably protect or prohibit the nondisclosure policies insofar as they blocked disclosure to persons other than co-workers.  Moreover, California's… Read More

This decision holds that the US Supreme Court's later decision in Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters (2010) 561 U.S. 287, which expressly rejected the notion that labor arbitration disputes should be analyzed differently than commercial arbitration disputes undermined the reasoning of both Pacesetter Construction Co. v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Conference Bd. (9th Cir. 1997) 116… Read More

When employees are compensated on a piece work basis, they must be separately compensated at either the minimum wage or higher contractual wage rate for the rest breaks to which they are legally entitled.  If the employees are allowed to take the rest breaks, but are not separately compensated for them, they can choose either, but not both, of the… Read More

Under Lab. Code 3366 civilian who assists any peace officer in active law enforcement service at the request of the peace officer's request is deemed to be a public employee as a matter of law and is entitled to workers compensation for any injury sustained while providing that assistance.  However, since workers compensation is available, the person assisting the police… Read More

CCSF wrongly terminated Morgado's employment as a police officer.  While he was no longer working for CCSF, Morgado was engaged as a broker, earning $181,000 in gross income.  This decision holds that Morgado's earnings as a broker must be offset agaisnt the damages he is awarded against CCSF whether for front or back pay.  Morgado is entitled only to be… Read More

Two employees filed separate PAGA suits against employer.  Employer settled with the first employee who sued it, and the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) accepted its share of the settlement proceeds.  The second employee then moved to intervene and object to the settlement.  Held:  The trial court did not err in denying the motion to invtervene.  The motion was… Read More

Joining the 1st Circuit, this decision holds that a worker can be "engaged in interstate commerce" and thus exempt from the FAA even though the worker, himself, does not cross state lines--so long as he is part of a distribution chain that extends across state lines.  Thus, Amazon's "last-mile" delivery drivers were exempt from the FAA.  Though they didn't cross… Read More

This decision affirms an order denying an employer's motion to compel arbitration.  Though it found only a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability in that the arbitration agreement was an adhesion contract, it holds that there was a high degree of unconscionability inherent in the arbitration agreement's (a) too restrictive limitation of discovery and (b) non-mutuality.  Discovery was limited to two… Read More

A doctor who was joined a hosptial's staff and was given clinical privileges and performed surgery at the hospital was an independent contractor, not an employee and so could not state a Title VII claim for discrimination in employment against the hospital.  He was on call with the hospital only 5 days a month, and his earnings from the hospital… Read More

Citing Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, this decision holds that the settlement and judgment in a prior class action and PAGA suit against the employer alleging the same meal and rest break violations is res judicata of plaintiff's similar PAGA claims.  Even though plaintiff opted out of the class action portion of the earlier case, he could… Read More

Summary judgment for defendant in an age and racial association FEHA discrimination case is affirmed.  The employer provided evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for firing plaintiff.  Plaintiff failed to introduce evidence raising a triable issue of fact that the stated reason was pretextual.  The few alleged comments about plaintiff's age--mostly that she looked much younger than her age--were harmless and… Read More

Professional football players failed to allege a viable negligence claim against the NFL on a theory of negligence per se in distributing prescription pain killers and other drugs to enable injured players to continue competing.  The complaint did not allege facts showing that the NFL directly or indirectly supplied players with drugs or coordinated activities of clubs to do so,… Read More

Under the continuing violations doctrine, an employer is liable for actions that took place outside the limitations period if these actions are sufficiently linked to unlawful conduct that occurred within the limitations period.  Here, Blue Fountain subjected the plaintiff to a continuous course of sexual harassment for more than a decade.  When plaintiff finally quit or was terminated, she sued. … Read More

When Judd, an actress, refused Harvey Weinstein's sexual advances, he bad-mouthed her to the producers of Lord of the Rings, and as a result, she was not hired for that blockbuster film.  Judd stated a viable claim against Weinstein for sexual harassment in violation of Civ. Code 51.9.  The section applies when the parties have one of several relationships specified… Read More

In some respects, the trial court's specification of reasons for granting a new trial, subject to a remittitur, for excessive damages was adequate.  For example, the trial court found that the jury had awarded duplicative damages for two different causes of action.  However, the appellate court held the reason was not supported by the record which showed there was substantial… Read More

In another wrongful termination and defamation case, this decision follows Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, in holding that a one-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is the constitutional limit.  Though emotional distress counts as physical injury for purposes of weighing reprehensibility, still plaintiff's emotional distress was not as severe as Roby's.  Also, as in Roby,… Read More

Santa Clara University is not a state actor and so cannot be sued for violation of 42 USC 1983 in firing one of its professors.  It did not become a state actor merely because it isrequired by generally applicable civil rights laws to ameliorate sex or other forms of discrimination. Nor does its receipt of federal and state funds conditioned… Read More

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