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In Owen v. I.C. System, Inc. --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 43525 (11th Cir. 2011), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit gave guidance in the post-Jerman world on the application of the bona-fide error defense. The Court explained that a ‘legal error’ under Jerman actually requires some exercise of legal judgment, explaining: There is no evidence, nor does… Read More

In Kelemen v. Professional Collection Systems, 2011 WL 31396 (M.D.Fla.), Judge Antoon ruled on what constitutes ‘obscene’ or ‘profane’ under the FDCPA 's section 1692d(2) (violation of the FDCPA for a debt collector to use “obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.”). Harkening back to Justice Stewart’s concurrence in… Read More

In Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 5463116 (N.D.Cal. 2010), Judge Wilken rejected a constitutional challenge to the TCPA after the United States intervened and opposed the argument. The case involved a suit against Defendants Autobytel, Inc ., B2Mobile, LLC, and LeadClick Media, Inc., under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (… Read More

In the context of debt collection, non-disclosure, blocking, or misrepresentation through telephone caller identification equipment has received attention from the FTC and courts. For example, one FTC complaint pleaded: 19. In numerous instances, including in connection with newly-acquired loans, [collector] has made collection calls to borrowers repeatedly and with excessive frequency under the circumstances. In addition, in numerous instances, [collector]… Read More

What is the frequency with which a creditor can attempt to reach, or actually communicate with, a debtor in connection with the collection of a consumer obligation?  The FDCPA established no statutory safe-harbor minimum or maximum call frequency; Congress specifically declined to issue bright line rules.  Recent jurisprudence has moved away from a numbers-based approach to examine the call frequency… Read More

In Kropf v. TCA, Inc., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 4722282 (E.D.Mich. 2010), Judge Lawson addressed whether a Plaintiff, who had filed suit against a debt collector and its president alleging violations of the FDCPA, should prevail on an FRCP 12(b)(6) motion as to debt collector’s counterclaim for attorney's fees and costs.   Judge Lawson noted that the FDCPA provides that,… Read More

In Cardenas v. AmeriCredit Financial Services Inc., 2010 WL 3619851 (N.D.Cal. 2010), the Plaintiffs sued to prevent the Defendant from collecting further based on a purportedly defective NOI letter.  Plaintiff filed a class action against the defendant, alleging claims for (1) violation of the UCL, which, in turn, is predicated on a violation of Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act, Cal.Civ.Code §… Read More

In Karapetian v. Kia Motors America, Inc., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 4678691 (C.D.Cal. 2010), Judge Carney exercised his discretion to reduce Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees in a lemon law case.  In Karapetian, the Plaintiff’s counsel rejected the defendant’s Rule 68 offer and did not do better in the ultimate settlement of the Action, even though Plaintiff prevailed in the case. … Read More

In Brown v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC (2010 Wl 4352932 (W.D.Tn. 2010), Judge Mays framed the issue on a Motion to Dismiss as whether "a debt collector calling a debtor's telephone seventeen times in one month and impermissibly calling a cellular telephone at least once plausibly violates section 1692d(5)".  The Court found that Plaintiff stated a claim, explaining that "the… Read More

In Marseglia v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 4595549 (S.D.Cal. 2010), Judge Houston put to rest questions about the common law torts of invasion of privacy and “tort-in-se”, as well as the question regarding whether the Rosenthal Act provides multiple penalties for debt collection torts.    As to the invasion of privacy claim deriving from purportedly… Read More

The United States Supreme Court decided not to take a better look at the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's holding in Gorman that FCRA did not pre-empt any remedy available under the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act.  The cite is FIA Card Services, N.A. v. Gorman -- S.Ct. --, 2010 WL 1047883 (2010) Read More

In AT&T v. Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 requires enforcement of arbitration clauses, even if such clauses contain class-action bans.   Oral argument is scheduled for November 9.  The parties’ briefs can be found here: petitioner's brief and respondent's brief; although many amicus briefs have been filed on both sides, we attach only the… Read More

In Perez v. Midland Funding, LLC, 2010 WL 4117461 (N.D.Cal. 2010), Judge Koh held that the National Bank Act and OCC regulations pre-empted Rees-Levering’s disclosure requirements that afford post-repossession reinstatement/redemption rights to consumers who have had their vehicles repossessed. Judge Koh followed the Aguayo decision, and held that:   Thus, although this Court agrees with the holding of Alkan, it… Read More

In Watts v. Enhanced Recovery Corp., 2010 WL 4117452 (N.D.Cal. 2010), Judge Koh held that the UCL does not provide standing to a plaintiff hinging the UCL claim on credit reporting problems -- in the absence of the plaintiff being deprived money in which the plaintiff held a property interest. Judge Koh explained: In 2004, California voters limited standing under… Read More

In Mora v. Harley-Davidson Credit Corp, 2010 WL 4008156 (E.D.Cal. 2010), Judge Wanger held that HDCC’s NOI letter failed Rees-Levering’s disclosure requirements – even if Rees-Levering allowed “substantial compliance”.  Judge Wanger explained:        Plaintiff contends that Defendant's NOI was deficient, inter alia, because the notice failed to state the actual amount Plaintiff was required to pay to effect… Read More

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