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Once an arbitrator has issued an "award," the arbitrator can alter or amend the award only within a prescribed time period and for strictly limited reasons.  CCP 1283.4.  Also, entry of an award triggers the court's jurisdiction to consider a petition to confirm or vacate the award.  So whether an arbitrator's ruling is an "award" has important consequences.  When the… Read More

Under Civ. Code 2924.15, HBOR's provisions apply only to owner-occupied properties.  But the section goes on to define "owner-occupied" as property that is the borrower's principal residence and security for a loan made for consumer purposes.  This decision reads the definition literally, holding that so long as the property is the borrower's principal residence, HBOR's provisions apply even if the… Read More

Summary judgment was properly entered for the employer in this wage and hour case.  The employer's expert showed that the employer's time rounding of clock in and out times to the nearest 15 minutes was facially neutral and neutral in practice as well.  Also, the employer disproved the employee's claim that he was denied meal and rest breaks.  Each weekly… Read More

A generic name—the name of a class of products or services—is ineligible for federal trademark registration. However, when the generic name is combined with a generic a generic Internet-domain name suffix like “.com,” the combined "generic.com" name is generic and ineligible for trademark protection only if the combined term, taken as a whole signifies a class of goods or services… Read More

If a foreclosure plaintiff seeks not only to foreclose on the property but also to recover the remainder of the debt through a deficiency judgment, then the plaintiff is attempting to collect a debt within the meaning of the FDCPA.  But if the plaintiff is simply enforcing a security interest by retaking or forcing a sale of the property, without… Read More

An order granting a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence must be supported by a specification of reasons that does more than just recite ultimate facts.  The specification must point to the evidence which convinced the trial court that there was insufficient evidence on a particular issue.  Here, the specification of reasons did not do so. … Read More

Plaintiffs' suit is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The suit challenged the city's establishment of two business improvement districts.  Under the applicable constitutional section authorizing those districts there is a detailed procedure for challenges to the proposed district, hearings and appeals.  The plaintiffs had not pursued those procedures.  They did not properly exhaust administrative procedures just by casting… Read More

Prob. Code 15401 sets out a statutory procedure for revocation of a revocable trust under which the trustor need only sign a revocation and deliver it to the trustee.  The trustor may avail himself of this statutory procedure unless the revocable trust expressly states that a different method of revocation set out in the trust instrument is the exclusive means… Read More

An action for an accounting upon dissolution of a corporation is not a special proceeding or an action for declaratory relief and thus is an action that triggers the compulsory cross-complaint rule under CCP 426.10 et seq. Read More

While a plaintiff may raise new legal theories on appeal from a dismissal on a general demurrer attacking the legal sufficiency of the complaint's factual allegations, that rule does not apply to an appeal from a dismissal on the ground that the claims alleged in the complaint are barred by the compulsory cross-complaint rule codified in CCP 426.10.  An appellate… Read More

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