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Six federal agencies issued a set of frequently asked questions (FAQs) today to help financial institutions, creditors, users of consumer reports, and issuers of credit cards and debit cards comply with federal regulations on identity theft and discrepancies in changes of address. The “Red Flags and Address Discrepancy Rules,” which implement sections of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act… Read More

Not all Plaintiffs are created equal under the FDCPA.  In Bank v. Pentagroup Financial, LLC, 2009 WL 1606420 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), Judge Gleeson held that a non-debtor has no standing to pursue a claim under 15 USC 1692c (debt collector can only communicate with the debtor, his attorney, or designated representative about the debt), but did have standing to pursue a harasment claim under… Read More

In Puttner v. Debt Consultants of America, 2009 WL 1604570 (S.D.Cal. 2009), Judge Hayes applied a liberal pleading standing to the FDCPA under FRCP 8.  The Plaintiff argued that “foundational facts need not be pled with particularity in order to state a claim under the FDCPA or the RFDCPA” and that “the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support claims for… Read More

In Hyde v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2009 WL 1587902 (9th Cir. 2009), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the FDCPA (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3)) does not allow an award of reverse attorneys’ fees against the debtor’s attorney, only the debtor.  In Hyde, the defendants prevailed on the merits against the debtor’s FDCPA… Read More

In Sullivan v. CTI Collection Services, 2009 WL 1587588 (M.D.Fla. 2009), Judge Moody held that threadbare recitals of the FDCPA fail to meet the pleading standard of FRCPs 8 and 12(b)(6).  Judge Moody explained:      While the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Conley, it has explicitly rejected the language relied on by Plaintiff in Bell Atlantic Corporation v.… Read More

In Pulliam v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., Inc., 2009 WL 1586012 (N.D.Ill. 2009), Judge Kennelly addressed whether a pro per Plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under FCRA arising from the defendant’s purported access of Plaintiff’s credit report without a permissible purpose.  The issue before the District Court was whether FCRA permits a creditor… Read More

In Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. --- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 2009 WL 1578400 (2009), the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held that the Song-Beverly Act did not preclude an award of pre-judgment interest.  The Court of Appeal explained:   Civil Code section 3287 is the statutory basis for pre-judgment interest.  Subdivision (a) of section 3287 states, in part: “Every… Read More

In Dotson v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 2009 WL 1559813 (E.D.Pa. 2009), Judge Shapiro denied class certification in an FDCPA matter arising out of a form dunning letter which purported to violate the FDCPA.  Judge Shapiro acknowledged that dunning letters under the FDCPA are analyzed under an objective standard from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor, but nevertheless held… Read More

In Kuschner v. Nationwide Credit, Inc. 2009 WL 1531574 (E.D.Cal. 2009), Judge Karlton ruled on whether a debt collector could assert a counter-claim against an FDCPA plaintiff due to the Plaintiff’s surreptitious recording of telephone calls between the Plaintiff and the debt collector.  The Court had ruled that the debt collector should be allowed leave to file the counter-claim, and… Read More

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