In Kayan v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 2013 WL 1010554 (C.D.Cal. 2013), Judge Bernal found no failure to validate under the FDCPA when the Plaintiff failed to dispute the claim within the statutory 30-days.

The uncontroverted evidence is that Palisades sent Plaintiff an initial demand letter on April 8, 2010. (Braun Decl., ¶ 5). Palisades did not receive any response to that letter from Plaintiff or anyone on her behalf. (Braun Decl., ¶ 6). On September 15, 2011, Palisades received a notice from the CRAs that Plaintiff was disputing the reporting of her account by Palisades, and on October 19, 2011 Palisades received a letter from Renatus Credit on behalf of creditor disputing the debt. (Braun Decl., ¶¶ 8–9). These communications occurred more than a year after the initial demand letter. Therefore, since Section 1692g(b) provides that a consumer must notify the debt collector in writing within thirty days of the initial demand letter, Plaintiff’s responses were not timely. Thus, since Plaintiff has not provided any facts to the contrary, there is no material issue of fact as to whether Palisades violated Sections 1692g (a) and (b). Additionally, Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the Request for Admissions is deemed an admission that Palisades did not violate FDCPA.FN5 For these reasons, the Court finds that Palisades did not violate Section 1692g(a) or Section 1692g(b) and is entitled to summary judgment on these bases. Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(3); (Johnson Decl., ¶ 3).

In Anthony v. Cach, LLC, 2013 WL 989883 (C.D.Cal. 2013), Judge Snyder held the same thing:

Similarly, the Court dismisses plaintiff’s claim for overshadowing under section 1692g. Overshadowing occurs when a debt collector sends a consumer the statutorily required notice regarding validation under section 1692g, but includes other language that con-tradicts the information in the statutorily required notice to such an extent that it would make “the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights.” Jacobson v. Healthcare Financial Services, Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d. Cir.2008). Plaintiff’s claim for over-shadowing fails, however, because plaintiff has not identified any communication between plaintiff and defendant other than the summons and complaint in the state court lawsuit. Consequently, plaintiff has not identified either a communication containing the statutorily required notice in section 1692g, nor any communication that could have overshadowed that notice. Plaintiff’s claim should therefore be dismissed with leave to amend, to allow plaintiff to identify the communication in which plaintiff was provided with the statutorily required notice under section 1692g and the communication which allegedly overshadowed that notice.

Similarly, in  Lyles v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 2013 WL 987723 (C.D.Cal. 2013), Judge Gilford found no failure-to-validate violation when the Plaintiff could not plead that a validation letter was sent in the first instance and that Plaintiff failed to demand validation within the statutory 30-days.

First, Plaintiff alleges that the MacDowell Defendants violated the Section 1692g by continuing their efforts to collect Plaintiff’s debt after she disputed the validity of the debt. (FAC, at 8.) In its December Order, the Court dismissed both FDCPA claims because Plaintiff had not alleged that she disputed the debt with the MacDowell Defendants within 30 days of receiving notice. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (requiring debt collectors to stop collection efforts if consumer disputes the debt in writing within 30 days after receiving notice). Plaintiff has not corrected this deficiency. Plaintiff still alleges that she notified the MacDowell Defendants that she disputed the debt on May 19, 2012, more than 30 days after Plaintiff allegedly received notice on March 15, 2012. (See FAC, at 7–8.) Plaintiff therefore fails to allege an FDCPA violation based on validation. ¶  Second, Plaintiff alleges that “communications from the Defendants to the Plaintiff discuss alleged amount owed and solicit methods to tender immediate payment, which overshadows the consumer warning.” (FAC, at 9.) Like the validation claim, Plaintiff’s overshadowing claim fails because she has not alleged that she timely notified the MacDowell Defendants of the dispute. The overshadowing claim also fails be-cause she has not alleged that the debt collection communication contained language “likely to deceive or mislead a hypothetical ‘least sophisticated debtor’ … or language regarding payment of the alleged debt [that] contradicted or overshadowed the validation notice.”   Elliot v. Credit Control Services, Inc., 2010 WL 1495402, at *2–3 (S.D.2010) (citing Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir.1997)). In her FAC, Plaintiff makes the same conclusory allegation that the Court previously found did not adequately identify the language likely to deceive a debtor and overshadow the notice. (FAC, at 9). ¶  Third, Plaintiff asserts a claim under Section 1692f of the FDCPA. Section 1692f prohibits debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. In paragraph 23 of her FAC, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]hrough this conduct, [the MacDowell Defendants] used an unfair unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.” (FAC ¶ 23.) Plaintiff’s reference to “this conduct” apparently refers to the MacDowell Defendants’ purported misrepresentations, alleged in paragraphs 20–23. Plaintiff has presented no facts to support these assertions. She also fails to state a claim under Section 1692f of the FDCPA.

Judge Guilford also found that the Plaintiff stated no FCRA claim because she failed to plead an inaccuracy, compiling cases that so held:

Courts have held that consumers asserting Section 1681 s–2(b) violations based on “furnishing in-accurate information [ ] must identify which information is inaccurate.” Noel v. Bank of America, No. 12–4019–SC, 2012 WL 5464608, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Nov.8, 2008) (citing Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 588 F.Supp.2d 1089, 1096 (N.D.Cal.2008)); see also, e.g., Mortimer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass’n, C 12–1936 CW, 2012 WL 3155563, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug.2, 2012); Manukyan v. Cach, LLC, No. CV–12–08356 RGK (JCx), 2012 WL 6199938, at *3 (C.D. Dec. 11, 2012). Plaintiff has not done so here, so her claim fails.