In Krier v. United Revenue Corp., No. 3:19-CV-2954-G, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74844 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2020), Judge Fish allowed an FDCPA claim premised on 15 USC 1692e(8) because the debt collector did not report the account a disputed.

Krier claims that United violated Section 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by failing to include notice of Krier’s dispute in the account update that United allegedly furnished to Experian on December 14, 2018. Complaint at 5-8. Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from communicating “to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). United argues that Krier fails to state a claim under Section 1692e(8) because (1) Krier never disputed the debt directly to United, and (2) Krier fails to support his allegation that Experian notified United of Krier’s dispute. Motion at 13. The court finds these arguments unpersuasive. First, although Krier does not allege that he directly notified United of his dispute, Section 1692e(8) does not require a plaintiff to notify a debt collector directly. Rather, a debt collector can be held liable under Section 1692e(8) for communicating credit information which the debt collector knows or should know to be false, irrespective of the source of such knowledge. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8); Sayles v. Advanced Recovery Systems, Inc., 865 F.3d 246, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Brady v. Credit Recovery Co., Inc., 160 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 1998)) (“[Section 1692e(8)’s] ‘knows or should know’ standard requires no notification by the consumer, written or oral, and instead, depends solely on the debt collector’s knowledge that a debt is disputed, regardless of how or when that knowledge is acquired.”). Thus, the fact that Krier did not notify United of his dispute directly is not dispositive of whether United knew or should have known about Krier’s dispute. Second, the court concludes that Krier’s allegations give rise to a plausible inference that United violated Section 1692e(8). Krier alleges that he notified Experian of his dispute by letter on April 27, 2018, and that Experian had a duty under the FCRA to report the dispute to United. Complaint at 4; Response at 8-9. Experian was required by law to notify United (as furnisher of the disputed information) of the dispute within five business days of receiving Krier’s letter. See Shaunfield v. Experian Information Solultions, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d 786, 795 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (Lynn, J.) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2)) (A credit reporting agency must “notify the furnisher of the disputed information of the consumer’s dispute within five business days of being notified by the consumer.”). Finally, Krier alleges that Experian notified United of Krier’s dispute (see Complaint, ¶¶ 26, 88; Response [*13]  at 7), but that United nonetheless failed to indicate the dispute when United furnished updated account information to Experian in December, 2018. The court finds it reasonable to infer that Experian complied with its statutory duty under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2) and notified United of Krier’s dispute after receiving Krier’s dispute letter. Accordingly, the court concludes that Krier has stated a claim for relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) that is plausible on its face.