In Young v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 2011 WL 1766058 (N.D.Tex. 2011), Judge Ramirez found a triable issue of fact as to whether an FDCPA claimant was harassed by telephone in connection with the collection of a debt, explaining:


To meet his summary judgment burden, Plaintiff must produce some evidence from which the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass may be inferred. This intent may be inferred from the frequency, pattern, or sub-stance of the telephone calls that he received from the debt collector or the place to which the calls were made. See Kerwin v. Remittance Assistance Corp., 559 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1124 (D.Nev.2008); Akalwadi v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 336 F.Supp.2d 492, 505 (D.Md.2004). There is no bright line rule as to the specific amount or pattern of calls sufficient to raise a fact issue regarding the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass; courts simply disagree on the amount or pattern of calls needed to raise a triable fact issue. See Smith v. ProCollect, Inc., 2011 WL 1375667, at *4 (E.D.Tex. Apr.12, 2011) (pointing out disagreement); Krapf v. Nationwide Credit Inc., 2010 WL 2025323, at *3–4 (C.D.Cal., May 21, 2010) (illustrating it).    Plaintiff proffers his affidavit testimony showing that the agency called him up to three times a day, up to five days a week, and called him before 8:00 a.m. and after 9:00 p.m.; his call log showing that during a seventy-three day window between October 25, 2009 and January 6, 2010, the agency placed at least thirty-three calls to him, with three calls a day on at least two occasions; and his deposition testimony showing that the agency called him more than once a week, at least five times a week, and that every time he spoke to an agency representative, he told him or her to stop calling him. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a material fact issue as to whether the agency called him constantly and continuously with the intent to harass, abuse, or oppress. Because of this triable fact issue, the agency is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s §§ 1692d and 1692d(5) claims.