In Chladni v. University of Phoenix, Inc., 2016 WL 6600045, at *3 (E.D.Pa., 2016), Judge Leeson found that a TCPA Plaintiff could not invalidate her consent to receive autodialed calls on the basis that she was not given a meaningful opportunity to avoid them.

It is undisputed that on June 22, 2015, when Chladni submitted a job application online, she checked a box indicating that she consented to receive telephone calls from the University. Chladni’s Dep. 33:14-37:15. Chladni contends, however, that she “had to check that box” and that she did not want to check it. Id. at 34:8-35:5. Regardless of whether or not Chladni felt that she “had to check” the box, she was not forced to submit a job application online. Her decision to take advantage of the website’s services and to check the box was voluntary. See Schwartz-Earp v. Advanced Call Ctr. Techs., LLC, No. 15-cv-01582, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30319, at *18-20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2016) (concluding that the plaintiff’s act of providing her cell phone number when she applied for a credit card was a voluntary act because she was not forced to obtain the credit card). There is no evidence that Chladni was coerced or tricked into checking the box, and the language of the consent was short and clear. See Haysbert v. Navient Solutions, Inc., No. CV 15-4144, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30720, at *25 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016) (rejecting, with “little trouble,” the plaintiff’s argument3 that the website’s terms were unenforceable as a contract of adhesion, and finding that the terms were “short, straightforward, and unambiguous” and that there was no evidence that the plaintiff was “coerced, rushed, bullied, or tricked into submitting his phone number”). The terms of the consent, which Chladni had the ability to revoke as evidenced by her decision only three days later, are enforceable and constitute prior express consent under the TCPA. See id. at *26-27 (finding that the defendant’s website terms, “were not unduly harsh, oppressive, or unfair because [the p]laintiff could easily undue [sic] them” by revoking consent and therefore counted as prior express consent for the defendant to call him using an automated dialing system).

Chladni also attempts to invalidate her consent by arguing that her agreement to receive autodialed calls was made a condition of purchasing or obtaining a good or service. However, the FCC Rules and cases Chladni cites to support this position state only that prior express consent cannot be conditioned on “purchasing” any good or service. See Lennartson v. Papa Murphy’s Holdings, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 725, at *7-9 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2016); In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the TCP Act of 1991 et al., 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 8013-16 (June 18, 2015); 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(v)(A)(ii); 2012 FCC Order, 27 FCC Rcd. at 1844, 1863. There is no allegation that Chladni’s consent was obtained while making a purchase from the University. In fact, the language in the consent expressly advised Chladni that “[t]his consent is not required to purchase goods or services.” SeeDef.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 7. Chladni’s argument is therefore rejected and does not invalidate her prior express consent to the University on June 22, 2015