In Kostik v. ARS National Services, Inc., 2016 WL 69904, at *2-4 (M.D.Pa. 2016), Judge Nealon declined to certify a Douglass-type FDPCA case for interlocutory review, believing that there is no substantial grounds for a difference of opinion.

Defendant claims that there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion as to whether the disclosure of a barcode allegedly embedded with plaintiff’s account number on a debt collection envelope can constitute a violation of section 1692f(8). (Doc. 14, pp. 2-7); (Doc. 18, pp. 6-9). In support of this argument, Defendant directs the Court’s attention to a number of district court decisions that have considered section 1692f under the same or similar circumstances present sub judice. but found that the FDCPA had not been violated. (Doc. 14, pp. 2-7).  Defendant first cites to two (2) decisions from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Id at pp. 2-3). Specifically, Defendant directs the Court’s attention to Waldron v. Professional Medical Management. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34402 (E.D. Pa. 2013), and Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110708 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“Douglass n). rev’d. 765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014)”. . . .Defendant also cites to a number of district court decisions from outside the Third Circuit: Perez v. Global Credit and Collection Corp.Gelinas v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau. Inc.: Gonzalez v. FMS. Inc.: Davis v. MRS BPO. LLC: and Sampson v. MRS BPO, LLC. . . While the aforementioned district court decisions from outside of the Third Circuit clearly establish that courts have either disagreed with or declined to follow the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Douglass II. those cases fail to demonstrate that there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion as to the application of Douglass II within the Third Circuit. . . Notably, Defendant has not cited to a decision from the Third Circuit that has applied Douglass II in a manner that conflicts with this Court’s July 22, 2015 Memorandum and Order presently at issue. Rather, there have been number of decisions from within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit that have applied Douglass II to circumstances similar to those sub judice and reached decisions consistent with this Court’s July 22, 2015 Memorandum and Order. . . Even if it was determined that there was a lack of controlling law as to the issue presented, while the fact that the Third Circuit has yet to directly address an issue weighs in favor of certification, it is “far different from demonstrating that grounds for a substantial difference of opinion exists ….”