In White v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2012 WL 4958516 (N.D.Ohio 2012), Judge Polster found no OCC pre-emption of Ohio’s post-repossession notice requirement:

The only courts to have addressed these OCC regulations and state-law notice requirements relating to repossession have reached the same conclusion. See Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912 (9th Cir.2011), cert. denied, U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Aguayo, No. 11–1204, 80 USLW 3570 (Oct. 1, 2012); and Epps, 675 F.3d 315, 323 (4th Cir.2012). The facts in Aguayo and Epps are identical to the facts in this case: a state law required certain information be provided to a debtor once a vehicle has been repossessed, and the notice sent to the debtor tracked the language of that law but was deficient in the same ways now alleged in this case. See Aguayo, 653 F.3d at 916;  Epps, 675 F.3d at 318. Aguayo, 653 F.2d at 919. This Act, like RISA, prohibits collection of any deficiency if the seller violates the statutory requirements. See Cal. Civ.Code § 2983.8(b). ¶  The Aguayo court started its analysis with the words that begin § 7.4008(d)(8): “Disclosure and advertising.” 653 F.3d at 916. The court explained that “[t]he term ‘disclosure’ is commonly used to refer to an informational statement of terms prior to entering a transaction.” 653 F.3d at 916 (emphasis added). Per § 7.4008(d)(8), these “disclosures” include “specific statements, information, or other content to be included in credit application forms, credit solicitations, billing statements, credit contracts, or other credit-related documents.” 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)(8). The court recognized, [t]he choice and arrangement of words in the OCC regulation, starting with “[d]isclosures and advertising” and followed by “including,” indicate that the later words are meant to be examples of types of disclosure and advertising-two words that generally mean to present information to the public, particularly before or in the process of consummating a transaction.  Aguayo, 653 F.3d at 927. “A notice, on the other hand, is a specific communication of a claim or demand submitted to a party in the course of, or at the conclusion of, a transaction.” Id. at 927. The Fourth Circuit, in Epps, found the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning persuasive and agreed “that the notices here, which only relate to debt collection upon default under an existing loan, are not ‘disclosures’ within the meaning of the [NBA] and OCC regulations.” 675 F.3d at 324. In sum, both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits courts have held that § 7.4008(d)(8) does not expressly preempt state laws relating to repossession notice requirements. ¶  Defendant is not dissuaded by these cases and, for support, Defendant cites Crespo v. WFS Financial, Inc., 580 F.Supp.2d 614 (N.D.Ohio 2008). There the court had to construe a regulation with an express preemption clause similar to the express preemption clause in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d). The court concluded that state laws imposing post-possession notice requirements are expressly preempted. Id. ¶  Despite appearances, Crespo is not on point be-cause the regulations at issue in that case, which were promulgated by the Office of Thrift Supervision, do not contain a savings provision exempting laws related to debt collection. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 with 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(e); Crespo, 580 F.Supp.2d 614. See also Aguayo, 653 F.3d at 921–922 (finding Crespo distinguishable).  ¶  The Court finds that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 does not expressly preempt the repossession notice requirements in either RISA or OUCC.