In Baisden v. Credit Adjustments, Inc., 2015 WL 1046186 (S.D.Ohio 2015), Judge Sargus found that a Hospital’s intake procedures provided sufficient documentationt that a patient consented to be called by an autodialer on his cellular telephone by the Hospital’s affiliate, an anesthesiologist as well as by the anesthesiologist’s debt collection agency.
In accordance with this reasoning, this Court finds Plaintiffs’ argument regarding Defendant’s redrafting of the TCPA not well taken. Neither Consultant Anesthesiologists nor CAI as Consultant’s debt collector were required to obtain permission from Plaintiffs to call their cellular telephone numbers by autodialed or prerecorded calls in an attempt to collect on their accounts. Autodialed and prerecorded mes-sage calls to wireless numbers provided by the called party in connection with an existing debt are made with the “prior express consent” of the called party. . . . B. FCC’s Implementing Regulations. Plaintiffs next argue that even though the FCC’s implementing regulations are binding, (1) they do not apply under the facts of this case and/or (2) the Patient Consent and Authorization forms completed by Plaintiffs do not provide for their cellular telephone numbers to be transferred to Consultant Anesthesiol-ogists. ¶ 1. 2008 FCC Declaratory Ruling. Plaintiffs contend that the FCC’s 2008 Declara-tory Ruling is subject to two important limitations that prohibit it from being applied in this case. First, Plaintiffs argue that they only gave their wireless telephone numbers to Mount Carmel Hospital while filling out their admission consent forms, but that they did not provide their telephone number directly to their creditor, Consultant Anesthesiologists “(and hence to CAI as Consultant’s debt collector).” (Pls.’ Mem. in Opp. at 9, 13.) Plaintiffs assert that this is fatal to CAI’s defense because “prior express consent is deemed to be granted only if the wireless number was provided by the consumer to the creditor.” Id. at 9 (quoting 2008 Declaratory Ruling, 23 F.C.C. Red. 559, 564). And, Plaintiffs continue, “ ‘[p]rior express consent provided to a particular creditor will not entitle that creditor (or third party collector) to call a consumer’s wireless number on behalf of other creditors, including on behalf of affiliated entities.’ “ Id. at 10 (quoting In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, Declaratory Ruling, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 559, n. 38). Second, Plaintiffs maintain that for this same reason, i.e., that they provided their cellular numbers only to Mount Carmel Hospital, the numbers were not “provided during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed” as required by the 2008 Declaratory Ruling. Plaintiffs rely upon, inter alia, Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., 944 F.Supp.2d 1226 (S.D.Fla.2013), which is directly on point. . . .Thus, under the 2008 FCC Declaratory Ruling, wireless telephone services subscribers such as Plain-tiffs Baisden and Sissoko could provide their number to a creditor like Consultant Anesthesiologists, and grant prior express consent to receive autodialed or prerecorded calls, by affirmatively giving an intermediary like Mount Carmel Hospital permission to transfer the number to Consultant Anesthesiologists for use in billing. Mais, 768 F.3d at 1123–24 2014) (“Thus, under the 2008 FCC Ruling a cell phone subscriber like Mais could provide his number to a creditor like Florida United—and grant prior express consent to receive autodialed or prerecorded calls—by affirmatively giving an intermediary like the Hospital permission to transfer the number to Florida United for use in billing.”). Plaintiffs here gave Mount Carmel Hospital just such permission, i.e., to provide their contact information to “other health care providers,” “other providers involved in [their] medical care,” “or persons involved in [their] care,” for “billing and payment” or “billing and collecting moneys due from [them].” (Certificate of Med. Rec. Custodian, ECF Nos. 19–1 at 2–3; Resp. to Req. for Admissions, ECF No. 19–5 at 18–19.) . . .Consultant Anesthesiologists is easily considered one of the “other health care providers” that served Plaintiffs at Mount Carmel Hospital, and its attempts to be paid for its services certainly constitutes “billing and payment.” It is undisputed that Consultant Anesthesiologists provided medical services to Plaintiffs during their hospitalization at Mount Carmel, for which Plaintiffs failed to pay. Therefore, considering the content of the hospital admission forms, the Court finds that Plaintiffs agreed to have their health information, including their cellular telephone numbers, provided to Consultant Anesthesiologists so that it could, inter alia, bill them for its services and attempt to collect payment for those same services.