In Zucker v. HSBC Bank, USA, et. al., 2018 WL 2048880, at *8–9 (E.D.N.Y., 2018), Judge Hurley hoisted Reyes on its own petard, finding that consent to call given in a credit application was not, at the pleadings stage, broad enough consent for the inevitable debt collection calls to be made by an ATDS.
Plaintiff has alleged that PHH (1) called his cell phone to demand payments of amounts he did not owe; (2) an automated telephone dialing system was used to make these calls as evidenced by the silence prior to a representative coming on the line; (3) the call were made to his cell phone without express consent.  Defendants maintains, however, that the claim should be dismissed because in his loan application Plaintiff gave his express consent, in writing, to call his cell phone. Defendants have supplied the Court with a redacted version of that loan application. Plaintiff objects to consideration of this document on the basis that it is not integral to the complaint and disputes the authenticity of the document as its redaction makes it impossible to determine whether the submitted document is authentic. . . Assuming arguendo that the loan application may properly be considered, it does not warrant dismissal of the TCPA claim. It is not clear that the consent contained therein covers the telephone calls of which Plaintiff complains. See generally Reyes, 861 F.3d at 57-58 (distinguishing decisions in which a plaintiff consented to receive phone calls in an application from the case before it in which the plaintiff’s consent was contained as an express provision of a contract to lease an automobile). Nor is it clear whether the number provided on the application was Plaintiff’s home or cell phone number.